tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post5569011796030130458..comments2023-08-27T12:35:12.308+02:00Comments on sanscrite cogitare, sanscrite loqui: Subject, agent, language and realityelisa freschihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17068583874519657894noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-22215341959885525212010-07-22T14:40:26.712+02:002010-07-22T14:40:26.712+02:00Well, the discussion gets interesting (at least fo...Well, the discussion gets interesting (at least for me).<br /><br />–As for your 14 h comment:<br />It might be that 2. does not follow from 1. But it would be quite strange for me that within a *semantic* description of kārakas R. would describe the svatantrakartṛ in purely formal terms.<br /><br />–As for kārakas and vibhaktis: I think Mīmāṃsakas fail to distinguish them because I am not aware of any passage distinguishing the two levels. The kāraka-terminology is used and so is the vibhakti-one and they are even used side by side (see TR IV §11.7.1) but I fail to grasp any awareness of their difference. Do you? More in general, I think that TR IV §11.7.1 and the other instances of a distinction between the kāraka- and the reality-level are possible also because Mīmāṃsakas do not seem to distinguish between the formal representation (vibhakti) and its meaning a factor of action (kāraka). Hence, they can conclude that language is whimsical and does not reflect reality. <br />On the other hand, I miss your point as for kṛt suffixes and sakarmaka/akarmaka dhātus. I am not saying that Mīmāṃsakas ignored the kāraka theory, but rather that they did not understand it as a theory of "deep roles" (as in Chomsky). The latter would not change and cannot be whimsical, only vibhaktis can. <br /><br />–As for dative, etc.:<br />Translations are always arguable. I tend to prefer an imprecise translation (using "dative" if followed by R.'s nearer explanation of it) than one which is more precise but less communicative. But I agree with the fact that the Latin terminology may be misleading.<br /><br />–Last, how do you understand the difference between subject and agent? In which sphere do you claim I mix the two? If in the philosophical one, I am ready to admit that I think they are one and the same self.elisa freschihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17068583874519657894noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-34750781955450016772010-07-22T14:28:38.061+02:002010-07-22T14:28:38.061+02:00Sorry, I realized I wasn't clear in my comment...Sorry, I realized I wasn't clear in my comments about the following:<br /><br />"But, if you contrast it with the definition of karaṇa, you see that the latter is "what is necessarily included in an action initiated for another purpose". Hence, I think it is legitimate to read the svatantrakartṛ's independence as contrasted to this and, therefore, as referring to its role in the undertaking of the action."<br /><br />To be 'causally predominant' is not the same as 'to be necessarily included in an action initiated for another purpose'. Hence, to say that the kartaa is 'causally predominant' while the kara.na is 'necessarily included in an action initiated for another purpose' does not mean one is unable to distinguish between these two.KoSahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16673488407171806241noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-38533999671077785762010-07-22T14:25:11.828+02:002010-07-22T14:25:11.828+02:00P.S.: I had forgotten to ask:
Once again you are ...P.S.: I had forgotten to ask:<br /><br />Once again you are stating that Mīmāṁsā philosophers conflate vibhaktis and kārakas. What does that mean, exactly? The passage you adduced shows that Rāmānujācārya, for one, clearly understands the distinction between the two; for example, he speaks of sakarmaka dhātus, hence he uses a kāraka-category outside of the morphological context of the vibhakti-endings. <br /><br />If they confuse kāraka and vibhaktis, how do the Mīmāṁsā thinkers distinguish between sakarmaka and akarmaka verbal forms? How do they explain kṛt suffixes? <br /><br />Furthermore, what is it that you translate as ‘dative’, ‘ablative’ and so forth? I know of no Sanskrit words which I would consider translatable by those terms, hence I am slightly confused (I don’t think there is in Sanskrit classical grammar anything which corresponds to the category of ‘cases’).<br /><br />A minor note: I think you are somehow conflating the subject with the agent.KoSahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16673488407171806241noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-83717281302441460612010-07-22T14:00:37.224+02:002010-07-22T14:00:37.224+02:00Well, then, I shall insist a bit more :)
As for t...Well, then, I shall insist a bit more :)<br /><br />As for the following:<br /><br />"1.But, if you contrast it with the definition of karaṇa, you see that the latter is "what is necessarily included in an action initiated for another purpose". 2.Hence, I think it is legitimate to read the svatantrakartṛ's independence as contrasted to this and, therefore, as referring to its role in the undertaking of the action."<br /><br />I think that 2. does not necessarily follow from 1..<br /><br />This is a discussion about kaarakas after all, and the only explanation of svatantra.h in svantantra.h kartaa that I know of takes it to mean pradhaana (the most prominent element of an action). R. himself says nothing of independence meaning anything different from that. Hence, what justifies your attribution of a completely different sense for svaatantrya (i.e., the faculty of decision in respect to initiating the action)? In brief, I think there is no textual basis for such an interpretation, nor is R.'s argument harmed in any way by taking svaatantrya in the (contextually fitting) sense of 'causal predominance'. On the contrary.<br /><br />Do you see my point?<br /><br />(PS - thank you for the kind offer)KoSahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16673488407171806241noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-14501154090913800882010-07-22T13:42:03.511+02:002010-07-22T13:42:03.511+02:00Dear KoSa,
I'm happy you insist! And I look fo...Dear KoSa,<br />I'm happy you insist! And I look forward for your work on kārakas. By the way, if you want to post on it, I am very willing to "host" you (or others).<br />As for your point: R. is quite clear (I think) in distinguishing a karaṇa from a svatantrakartṛ. The latter is used when one wants to stress svātantrya. You are right, this term might be used in its Grammatical meaning. But, if you contrast it with the definition of karaṇa, you see that the latter is "what is necessarily included in an action initiated for another purpose". Hence, I think it is legitimate to read the svatantrakartṛ's independence as contrasted to this and, therefore, as referring to its role in the undertaking of the action. But I'm open to criticisms.elisa freschihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17068583874519657894noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-12539791602708071112010-07-22T13:03:25.632+02:002010-07-22T13:03:25.632+02:00Dear Elisa,
a brief note:
sorry to insist on the...Dear Elisa,<br /><br />a brief note:<br /><br />sorry to insist on the same point. Once more, you ascribe to R. the view that an agent is 'independent' (svatantra) in the sense of having the faculty of decision in respect to whether to initiate an action.<br /><br />I have not yet understood - where exactly does R. state that?<br /><br />I may well be missing something.KoSahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16673488407171806241noreply@blogger.com