tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post5620147783254631631..comments2023-08-27T12:35:12.308+02:00Comments on sanscrite cogitare, sanscrite loqui: Conceptual/non-conceptual perceptionelisa freschihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17068583874519657894noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-8701521667247924822010-01-18T14:03:56.157+01:002010-01-18T14:03:56.157+01:00Dear Elisa, thank you very much for your brief but...Dear Elisa, thank you very much for your brief but extremely clear exposition! As you say, a distinction of stages between perception and “nominalization” is not detectable in Abhinavagupta. What I was trying to understand, and now I have caught it, is the way in which Abhinavagupta differentiates from Kumārila – the philosophy of whom I do not know very well! – on perception as far as the naming activity is concerned.krishnanoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-60091240395648582712010-01-18T12:49:08.217+01:002010-01-18T12:49:08.217+01:00Thanks for your comment, Krishna. The main differe...Thanks for your comment, Krishna. The main difference between Kumārila and Abhinavagupta's criticisms of Dharmakīrti, as far as I can tell, lies in their different attitudes. Abhinavagupta follows Bhartṛhari in maintaining that a subtle degree of vāc is present everywhere and identifies it with Consciousness, hence, with Īśvara himself. Kumārila, on the other hand, is a hard empiricist (for whatever does not regard the Veda). Hence, Abhinavagupta agrees with DhK in maintaining that only the first part of one's perception counts as perception BUT adds that even in this first part language is present (please feel free to correct me, since I cannot check now the passages you mention). On the other hand, Kumārila inserts sequence in (immediate, according to DhK) perception.<br />Or can one detect a real distinction of stages even within Abhinavagupta's account?elisa freschihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17068583874519657894noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6641738716446631837.post-79850554449834944742010-01-18T12:39:10.140+01:002010-01-18T12:39:10.140+01:00Your notes on Kimārila’s interpretation of savikal...Your notes on Kimārila’s interpretation of savikalpa pratyakṣa remind me the concept of pratyavamarśa of the Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir Śaivism. On account of that, I guess that Abhinavagupta’s position on pratyavamarśa, as determinate consciousness involved in perception, could help us to understand some of the main PHILOSOPHICAL points of Kumārila’s criticism of Dharmakīrti on this subject (I think, for instance, to Abhinavagupta’s Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī ad Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā I.5.18-19 and I.6.1-3, where the “application” of a name to the object perceived appears to be thought as directly involved in the very perception, because “speech” is said to be strictly associated, abhilāpa-yoga, with the indeterminate perception). What do you think: is this suggestion of mine going in the right direction?krishnanoreply@blogger.com