A first perplexity is purely methodological: often neuroscientific data are debated as if they were subject-independent conclusive evidences. As if their interpretation did not depend on a background theory, as if there was nothing one could argue against them. A friend suggested me that the ones who uphold these theses with such certainty have studied "maths mistaking it for philosophy", that is, they are not trained to critical thinking beyond that applied within the precinct of Natural Sciences. If a theory succeeds in not violating Natural Scientific laws, then it is sound –better, it is not even a theory, it is a fact.
A further point is the following: even if the Neurosciences were absolutely right in describing the brain, how does this affect our understanding of ourselves? Th. Metzinger nicely puts it in the Acknowledgments of his Being No One:
This book has a long history. Many people and a number of academic institutions have supported me along the way.The introspectively accessible partition of my phenomenal self-model has it that I first became inflected with the notion of a "self-model" when reading […] but doubtlessly its real roots run much deeper.
Metzinger might be right or wrong, but the shift of terminology in the second sentence sounds awkward, as if I would at once start using here formal logic or the Nāvya Nyāya language to develop my argument. Hence, in Vico's terminology, it might be true, but it is not certain, that is, it cannot be communicated, it will never be part of what we can debate about, exactly because it is not "introspectively accessible". From the point of view of our introspection, it is just as non-influential as the account of how respiration occurs. We need to breath, but to know the chemical aspect of it does not change either our breathing, or our experience of it.