One hazard of thinking
1 hour ago
Thinking correctly, talking Sanskrit. These pages are a sort of virtual desktop of Elisa Freschi. PLEASE MOVE TO MY NEW BLOG: elisafreschi.com
A is B and B is C. tataḥ A is C
A is B and B is C. For that reason, A is C
A is B and B is C. For this reason, A is C.
It is not the case that in memory an object previously experienced is manifested in its sheer own form (kevala), like in an intellectual intuition (yogijñāna) having a past object as its content. For, in this way (if the object devoid of any connotation were manifested), it would not have its character of memory. It is said that in memory, the quality of being past only [occurs] through the experience, although the object is in itself changeless. Hence, the manifestation of the experience is here useful. Therefore [the author of the short gloss] says: "And a previously experienced object, together with the experience". And memory has the form of a cognition, therefore he speaks of "light of memory" (my translation).
Nor is the appearance of a remembered thing possible, if there is a separation [of the past experience] from memory, |
Therefore this knower is the unity of cognitions pertaining to different times || 1.4.3 ||
And the object which has been experienced before [and] which appears now together with that experience in the light of the memory regarding that time, must be unseparated from memory, because something separated from the light cannot shine. In this way, the unity of the cognitions such as experience and memory is the Self, the knower.
The author [of the Strophes] shows that:(smṛtikāle ca pūrvakālāvacchedenārthābhāsasya samarthitasya vārtamānikasmṛtiprakāśād bhedo nopapadyata ity anubhavasmṛtyābhāsayoḥ śarīrībhūta eko ’rthaḥ tayor apy ekatam ākṣipatīti copadarśayan draṣṭāraṃ smartāraṃ caikam upapādayati.)
1. at the time of recollection, there cannot be any difference [between the subject who is recollecting now a certain pot and the one who saw it in the past], because what is manifested in the present memory is the appareance of the object further determined [as having been perceived in] a previous time,
2. the same physical object of both the appearances [of it] in the [past] experience and in the [present] memory implies the unity of both.
By doing that, he proves that the [past] seer and the [present] recollector are one and the same.
(that is, the coordinated apprehension of the word meanings occurs through the coordinated apprehension of the sentence meaning, which again depends on suitable rules). Next:
The understanding of the sentence-meaning from the words (pada) occurs indeed in the following way. Firstly the words, while they are heard, cause one to remember (smṛ-) their respective meanings, reciprocally unconnected (ananvita). Then, having remembered them, in the hearer arises a reflection (vimarśa) regarding their own meanings, and beginning in this way: “This is one sentence, this is a split (bhinna) one; this is the meaning the speaker wished to convey (vivakṣita), this is the undesired meaning; this is metaphorical, this is primary; this is worthy of connection; this is principal, this is not principal; this has been prescribed, this has not been prescribed…”. Thereafter, there is a division of fit (yogya) and unfit regarding the coordinated apprehension (anusandhāna) of the exact word-(śabda) meanings through a coordinated apprehension according to the rules (nyāya) appropriate (aupayika) for the ascertainment (nirṇaya) of the sentence-meaning
Then these words, brought (back) to memory, express a related [meaning].
As I have discussed elsewhere, for Nyāya, default trust is the best attitude to take in our cognitive lives (p.16).
the earth and the other things [of the world] is a product, hence it has a doer, like a pot.Can we establish the existence of a doer out of the fact that the mountains, etc. are a product? Of course, a first problem could be how could we be sure that those things are a product. But a second one regards the legitimacy of an inference based on a concomitance we could never grasp (that between an embodied doer and its products).