What is seized by yogipratyakṣa?

Among other thinkers, Utpaladeva in his ĪPKvivṛti elaborates on yogins being able to grasp objects remote in time or space (in the past or in distant regions). Mīmāṃsākas deny that this is possible, on the ground that it contradicts everyday experience, but their strongest criticism is indeed devised against the specific application of yogipratyakṣa to dharma. In which cases could dharma be perceived according to the upholders of yogipratyakṣa? If it were a present or past thing, no matter how remote. So, Vedānta Deśika (here following a Mīmāṃsā argument garb found, e.g., in Śalikanātha and Rāmānujācārya) denies to dharma the status of a well-established thing –no matter how remote–, ready to be seized. On the contrary, dharma is something to be established, and what will eventually lead to it is not the (e.g. sacrificial) action one presently sees, and refers to as "dharma".This seems to imply that yogipratyakṣa cannot apply to future objects or objects pertaining to the domain of what ougth to be (the elements of these two fields may coincide, but not the fields themselves).