The remembering subject is implicitly established because it bridges together two moments of time, since the statement that [memory occurs] in the present time depends on the distinction of the [present] light of memory from [the experience which occurred] at a past time. And the experienced object, accompanied by the previous experience, insofar as it is determined by its own time, which is past, is not distinct from what has it as its content (i.e., the present cognition) (viṣayin) determined by the present time. In fact, if the content, characterised by the fact that it does not deviate from what has it as its content (i.e., the present cognition) (viṣayin), were distinct from the light [i.e., the subject], there would be an incongruity. Therefore [the Vṛttikāra] said "appearing". […] This has been already said and will be said again.
(smṛtiprakāśasya tātkālikatvaviśeṣaṇena vartamānatoktyā kāladvayānusandhānāt smartṛsiddhir
upakṣiptā, na ca smṛtijñānasya vartamānāvacchinnasya viṣayiṇaḥ pūrvānubhavasahito ’nubhūto ’rtho ’tītarūpasvakālāvacchinno bhinnātmaiva viṣayyabhraṃśamānatālakṣaṇasya viṣayatvasya prakāśād bhede saty anupapatteḥ. tad ahā “avabhāsamāna” iti. […] etac coktaṃ purastād vakṣyate ca.)
(Vivṛti on ĪPK 1.4.3, edited by Raffaele Torella in Mélanges tantriques à la mémoire d'Hélène Brunner, my translation).
For other translations of Utpaladeva's Vivṛti, check the tag "Śaiva" and here.
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