Why do Mīmāṃsā authors classify prescriptions?

The main focus of the Mīmāṃsā is the exegesis of Sacred Texts, especially of their sacrificial portion, i.e., the Brāhmaṇas. There is already enough literature about how to perform a sacrifice (apart from oral instructions, practical manuals are called paddhatis or prayogas) and Mīmāṃsā authors point instead at systematising the mass of Vedic texts. Their systematisation is highly hierarchical and centripetal and has as its centre the sacrificial prescription. All the rest (narrative passages about myths, mantras, Upaniṣadic teachings, etc.) only makes sense –according to Mīmāṃsakas– insofar as it is connected to a prescription.

The standard Mīmāṃsā example of prescription is svargakāmo yajeta ("the one desirous of heaven should sacrifice"). To it an instrument, a result and a procedure are connected. And all ritual acts are classified in relation to it, so that at the end one can figure out a coherent whole ordered from the top (the prescription) until the minutest details.

The need for classification regards also prescriptions themselves. In fact, structuring the prescriptive component of a text allows one to better understand its hierarchical links. For instance, principal prescriptions (such as the one mentioned above) are to be distinguished from subordinate ones (such as the ones enjoining presacrifices or prescribing the ritual substances).

Since the Veda is authorless, the only possible perspectives on the text are the hearer's one and the text's inner one. Accordingly, at least two classifications of prescriptions are possible. The first one is: utpattividhi/viniyogavidhi/adhikāravidhi/prayogavidhi, the second one: apūrvavidhi/niyamavidhi/parisaṁkhyāvidhi. See previous posts for details.

The first classification expresses the role of each prescription and defines it –in Mīmāṃsā terminology– "according to its own nature" (svarūpābhidhāna). The latter conforms to the role of a prescription within a text from the point of view of the hearer. If it conveys something utterly new for the hearer, then it is an apūrvavidhi. If something partly new, it is a niyamavidhi. If it looks like a positive injunction but is instead to be interpreted as a prohibition, it is a parisaṁkhyāvidhi. The latter case, as already hinted at, is one Mīmāṃsā authors generally try to avoid.

(on the right: simplified map of the sacrificial area. From Jan Houben, www.jyotistoma.nl).

Meaning of suffixes 2

I found this nice table on the meaning of verbal suffixes in Vācaspati Upādhyāya's edition of the Arthasaṅgraha. It nicely points out how the meaning of suffixes is not necessarily analized into distinct physical elements.

For those who might not read Sanskrit, the main point is that the verbal suffix of the optative (just like all other exhortative verbal suffixes) conveys two meanings (see image in the next post).

Meaning of suffixes

Dance has a purpose, just like mantras

A friend sent me a passage of Abhinavagupta's commentary (Abhinavabhāratī) on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra. It is a further instance of the theory of bhāvanā being used as a commonly agreed upon example.

An objector maintains that dance has no meaning. It is replied that, just like mantras are not used because of their meaning, but are nevertheless not to be dispensed with, so also song (and dance is connected to song):

athocyate recakāṅgahāranibandhātmakaṃ yan nṛttaṃ na tena kaścid artho ’bhinīyate | api tu yathā viśiṣṭair mantraiḥ bhāvanāviśeṣaiś cābhyudayasiddhiḥ tathā viśiṣṭadevatāsūcakair mantrais tathā tad gīte cābhyadhāyi

But, like through various mantras and specifications of the bhāvanā (ritual action), good fortune is realised, and so [also] through mantras which suggest various deities, in the same way this has been explained [to occur] in the case of song.

Bhāvanāviśeṣais could hint at commendatory statements (arthavāda), which, like mantras, are also subsidiary to the main ritual action. Dance, hence, does not convey a meaning, but still has a purpose (artha).

If tathā devatāsūcakair mantraiḥ is not just a gloss, two different classes of mantras are pointed out since according to Mīmāṃsakas most mantras are meant to make one recollect the various ritual items, such as the Deities (viśiṣṭadevatāsucaka), whereas there is a minority of them which serves an invisible purpose (and, hence, directly contribute to the bhāvanā).

The text goes on and this is probably just a prima facie view.

Again on the classification of prescriptions: is there a rationale behind it?

I started working on the classification of prescriptions in order to make sense of a long passage in Ramanujacarya´s Tantrarahasya. As soon as I could understand it I started getting involved in the (Mimamsa) history which lead to it and in its historical significance. In fact, I could not find any other Mimamsa author classifying prescriptions in the same manner as Ramanujacarya. But, indeed, I could hardly find two authors sharing all the same classifications. In fact, there seem to be several different ways of classifying prescriptions (a boring text by Sankara Bhatta, the Mimamsabalaprakasa, dedicates approximately 20 pages to lists of different classifications of prescriptions).
The most common ones are:
-apurvavidhi,
-niyamavidhi,
-parisankhyavidhi.
And:
-utpattividhi,
-viniyogavidhi,
-adhikaravidhi,
-prayogavidhi.
The last two members are often inverted (so in Parthasarathi´s Nyayaratnamala, and Mimamsabalaprakasa, Mimamsanyayaprakasa, Arthasangraha).
But other classifications are also quite popular:
-karmotpattividhi,
-gunavidhi,
-visistavidhi.
Or also samanyavidhi-visesavidhi, arthakarmavidhi-gunakarmavidhi, utpattividhi-gunavidhi-adhikaravidhi, etc.
All authors seem to refer to a shared reservoir of possible prescriptions. Hence, I expected all those terms to be frequent in Brahmana and Srautasutras. But, as far as I could understand, this is not the case. Nor are they used in other texts I am aware of. Mimamsakas may have started systematising oral lores of sacrificers or they could have created themselves all those subclasses due to their own desire to classify and sistematize Vedic texts.

niyamavidhi and parisāmkhyavidhi

Niyamavidhis ("restrictive prescription"; for definitions and examples, see a preceding post and the comments thereon) can be found also in Grammatical literature. Sabara mentions them at least in two places (his commentary on 6.8.31 and 32).
The concept of parisamkhya is also ancient enough. I read about it in Sabara and in Kaiyata´s commentary on Patanjali´s Paspasā. The typical example mentioned is panca pancanakha bhaksya, that is "the five animals having 5 nails (or claws?) can be eaten" which indirectly implies that all other animals cannot be eaten.
Both are described in Kumārila´s Tantravārtika (on 1.2.4.38) and are later to be found in Parthasarathi Misra, Appayadiksita (who dedicates to them his whole Vidhirasāyana), Gāgābhatta´s Bhattacintamani. Sankara Bhatta mentions them in his Mimāmsābālaprakāsa together with tens of other kinds of prescriptions. More interesting, both the Arthasangraha and the Mimāmsānyāyaprakāsa mention them within their discussion about mantras. The Arthasangraha does not explain why, whereas the MNP makes the connection explicit. One could be inclined to think that mantras have more than one purpose, but it is not so because of a niyamavidhi stating that mantras are meant to make one remember the various elements of a ritual performance.
Moreover, the AS states that parisāmkhyavidhi is affected by two flaws, since it implies a meaning partly contradicting what is explicitly found in the Sacred Texts. Hence, parisāmkhyavidhi is a sort of extrema-ratio-vidhi, a last resource in case one need to make sense of an otherwise meaningless prescription. Possibly because of this reason, it is not mentioned in Rāmanujācārya´s Tantrarahasya and it does not seem to have been regularly implemented in Vedic exegesis.

Heretics in India and Tibet

In an interesting lecture (Vienna, June the 29th 2009), Dr. Pascale Hugon mentioned the debate held at sKyid Rong between Sa skya Paṇḍita and 6 "heretics". Only scant informations about its content have been recorded. It seems that the 6 heretics adored Brahmā and that Sa Paṇ convinced them (just) by saying that Brahmā is known to sleep and is hence dull. I'll here leave aside historic questions (such as: was Brahmā at all still adored at that time? the depiction of ascetics adoring him seems to depend heavily on Pāli examples) and consider only the argument. P.Hugon, answering a question, proposed that it could be a shortening of the one found in Tarkajvālā (possibly by Bhāviveka). According to the TJ, "Hindū" Gods are not capable of defending dharma because they are prey of rāga, dveṣa, moha. An example of moha is, in fact, Brahmā's sleep before each creation of the world. I wonder whether this could be a convincing argument for a non-Buddhist audience. In fact, Kumārila rather accuses the Buddha of not being a reliable speaker because he is allegedly free of rāga and has, hence, no desire to communicate at all (the desire to communicate is one of the characteristics of a reliable speaker since NS).