Final Balance on my 2012 projects: Veṅkaṭanātha

The following is the final balance I had to write about my first months (September 2012--end of the year) in the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

Sacred Texts’ Epistemology in Veṅkaṭanātha’s Seśvaramīmāṃsā

Participants: E. Freschi

The purpose of the project is the study of the dialectics of the conflicting epistemologies and world-views of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta as represented in Veṅkaṭanātha's Seśvaramīmāṃsā (SM). How can its author, for instance, be at the same time faithful to the Mīmāṃsā atheism and the Viśiṣṭādvaita devotion for Viṣṇu? How can he harmonise the Mīmāṃsā claim that the Sacred Texts are reliable insofar as they have no author with the Viśiṣṭādvaita one that the Sacred Texts have been authored by Viṣṇu? How can he make sense of the conflict between the Mīmāṃsā idea of permanence of the world and the theistic account of its creation? The project will explore the way in which Veṅkaṭanātha produced a new synthesis of these conflicting claims, by reinterpreting some of them and by organizing hierarchically the others.

For this purpose the text of SM 1 (i.e., the epistemological part of the SM, corresponding to approximately 2/3 of the whole SM) will be translated and its edition improved through an unedited manuscript found at Adyar Library.

Retrospect of 2012 (September-December): During the first four months of the project, the first folia of the Adyar Library manuscript of the SM have been collated and the first third of SM 1 has been translated and analysed on the basis especially of its principal model, a discussion on the unity of the Sacred Texts and their analysis in Rāmānuja's Śrī Bhāṣya. Interestingly, Veṅkaṭanātha follows closely the structure of Rāmānuja's argumentation, but brings to completely new results, i.e., to the inclusion of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā within the Canon of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.

Preview of 2013: The SM 1 will be completely translated. The comparison with Rāmānuja's text and with other texts by Veṅkaṭanātha, especially the Mīmāṃsāpādukā, will be continued. The collation of the Adyar Library manuscript of the SM will be continued. An article will be written on the topic of the innovations to Rāmānuja's position brought forth by Veṅkaṭanātha and a contribution on this topic will be presented at the DOT in Münster, September 2013. Prof. Lawrence McCrea will be in Vienna for one week in June 2013 for a reading session of the SM together with E. Freschi, M. Rastelli, M. Schmücker. A panel on epistemology will be hosted by E. Freschi (together with M. Cuono and P. Mindus) at the Symposium ''There is no Orient: 4th Coffee Break Conference", Turin, 5--7 September 2013.

Any suggestion concerning the Preview of 2013 are welcome!

On Veṅkaṭanātha, see, e.g., this post.

TOC of my forthcoming volume on reuse of texts in Indian Philosophy

This is the provisional Table of Content of the forthcoming volume on the analysis of the reuse in Indian philosophical texts.


Preface, by Raffaele Torella

The re-use of texts in Indian Philosophy, by Elisa Freschi (Vienna, ÖAW)

1. REUSE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS

Quotations, References, and the Re-Use of texts in the Early Nyāya Tradition, by Payal Doctor (CUNY-LaGuardia Community College)

Types of quotations as connected to the types of siddhānta in the Nyāyamañjarī 6, by Alessandro Graheli (Vienna)

Quotations of the Kāśikāvṛtti in Grammatical texts and the manuscript transmission of the Kāśikāvṛtti, by Malhar Kulkarni (IIT Mumbai)

Āgamārthānusāribhiḥ. Helārāja’s use of quotations and other referential devices in his commentary on the Vākyapadīya, by Vincenzo Vergiani (Cambridge)

Quotations, References, etc. A glance on a late Mīmāṃsaka's writing habits, by Elisa Freschi (Vienna, ÖAW)

Quotations and (lost) commentaries in Advaita Vedānta: Some philological notes on the 'Fragments' of Bhartr̥prapañca, by Ivan Andrijanić (Zagreb)

“Old is Gold!” Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s way of referring to earlier textual tradition, by Gianni Pellegrini (Turin)

Evaluation and classification of intertextual elements in a phi­lo­so­phi­cal Jaina Sanskrit work, by Himal Trikha (Vienna, ÖAW)


1.1 SUBFOCUS ON THE BUDDHIST MILIEU: IS THERE ANYTHING SPECIFIC?
The Case of the Sārasaṅgaha. Reflections on the Reuse of Texts In Medieval Singalese Pāli Literature, by Chiara Neri (Rome "Sapienza")

The creative erudition of Chapaṭa Saddhammajotipāla, a 15th-century grammarian and philosopher from Burma, by Aleix Ruiz-Falqués (Cambridge)

Dharmottara’s Re-Use of Arguments from the Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi in the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, by Masamichi Sakai (Cambridge, Massachusetts / Tokyo)

Commenting by quoting. The case of Manorathanandin's Pramāṇavārttikavr̥tti, by Cristina Pecchia (Vienna)

Text re-use in early Tibetan epistemological treatises, by Pascale Hugon (Vienna, ÖAW)

A discussion of some problems related to the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa with particular attention to the quotation from Saraha’s Dohākośagīti, by Krishna Del Toso (Trieste)

The introduction of canonical and non canonical quotations in Paali commentarial literature, by Petra Kieffer-Pülz (Mainz, AWL)

2. WIDENING THE PICTURE: RE-USE OUTSIDE IN NON-PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS

Quotations in Vedic Literature: is the changing of a mantra a stylistic device or
the degeneration of a “beautiful mind?, by Elena Mucciarelli (Tübingen)

To borrow or not to borrow? The case of "vaibhavīyanarasiṃhakalpa" within the scope of Pāñcarātra literature, by Ewa Debicka-Borek (Krakow)

Observations on the Use of Quotations in Sanskrit Dharmanibandhas, by Florinda De Simini (Naples/Turin)

Re-use in artistic field: the iconography of Yakṣī, by Cristina Bignami (Cagliari)

Any suggestion concerning the sections' titles, their sequence, their internal organization, etc.?

Is it possible to survive out of research on Sanskrit/Pāli/etc.?

From time to time someone asks me whether he or she will be able to make her living out of Sanskrit. The issue has been last raised by Jayarava in his comment to this post. The following one is my answer to the general question:

1. 1. Finding a scholarship for one's PhD is feasible, most of all if you are open to work on your PhD within someone else's project (for instance, in Heidelberg or Leiden for Buddhist studies) and can afford leaving your country.
2. 2. The departing point is that you will never become rich out of Sanskrit (better: it may happen, but just like it may happen that you become the president of your country).
3. 3. You will also hardly achieve a tenure-track position (it may happen, but you cannot count on it). Thus, if you cannot cope with instability, think twice before trying a Sanskrit-related career.
4. 4. Why would you want to work in the Academia at all costs? It is not heaven and if you think it is, you might be disappointed.
5. 5. There seem to be still job opportunities in two contexts, i.e., within someone else's projects and with a heavy didactic burden. 

Interestingly enough, in the last months two acquaintances of mine advertised some positions within a project and in all cases the applications were hardly more than the positions advertised, so that there was basically no possible selection.

Thus, the point is: Are you willing to work for someone else's project? Or do you understand research only as your own research? Alternatively, are you willing to teach "Introduction to South Asian studies"? Last, are you ready to move to a different country? You cannot expect to find a Sanskrit related position in each county…

For further information on the advertisements I referred to, check the label "opportunities and projects". On Academia as not the only way to do research, check this post.

Is the Academia the best place to study Indian philosophy?

A recent post by Aleix Ruiz-Falqués has gone back to an issue I had dealt with years ago, because of a post by Amod Lele, i.e., does it make sense to remain in the Academia? Are Universities (Academies and similar institutions) the best place to persue one's interest for Sanskrit (and) Philosophy?

The pros and cons usually mentioned in this connection are:

1. 1. Time: if you work 8 hours a day at something else, you will have much less time and energy to focus on Sanskrit (and) Philosophy. However, University staff often laments the fact that they have to focus on different aims, such as teaching undergraduate classes on "Introduction to South Asian studies", writing projects, dealing with administrative problems, etc.
2. 2. Reunification of Career and Hobby (again, see this post by Amod Lele): officially working on the topics you love may make you more responsible towards them. However, if you a rebel or a procrastinator (i.e., someone who is ready to do whatever, in order to avoid fulfilling her primary duty), you might end up noticing that you spent more time on research when you were not officially researching.
3. 3. Money: Many would say that the fact of being paid is in itself something more than pleasant and that during the present crisis, it is very difficult to find jobs at PhD level. However, I am assuming here that the ultimate goal is one's happiness and that money plays a noteworthy, but not exclusive role, for it. Moreover, in the present crisis, one (almost) only finds temporary positions which are not particularly well-paid.
4. 4. Students: I tend to think that the pleasure of interacting with students is an end in itself. However, people engaged in undergraduate curricula in the US often hate their dull students, who come to the class only because they have to.
5. 5. Colleagues: Working on the Academia may mean having many interesting colleagues with whom you can discuss and share ideas. However, this is often not the case, and one may happen to share more gossip than research ideas, whereas the web is often a great place to virtually meet people with similar aims.

Long story short: The Academia is part of the world and it is not intrinsically better, nor worse than it. Working in it or outside it have both advantages and disadvantages and choosing for the one or the other must ultimately depend on an accurate self analysis: is one a rebel or an obliger? Does one appreciate having to do what one loves? Can one be in love with one's wife/hisband? If the answer to the latter two questions is no, it is probably better for one's happiness to work outside the Academia.

What has been your experience, within or without Universities (etc.)? 

yoga, yukta, yujyate, etc.: should we translate all cognate Sanskrit words with cognate English (etc.) ones?

Should we translate Sanskrit words deriving from the same root with English (French/German/Latin…) words deriving from the same root? Or at least try to?
How important was the commonness of the root for actual readers and listeners? How much do we loose if we interrupt their continuity?

This is my procedure:

1. 1. I try to translate words deriving from the same root with cognate English words. E.g., anvaya 'relation', anvi- 'to relate'.
2. 2. I admit exceptions for technical terms, whenever I think that the technical aspect is predominant. E.g., I translate anvaya as 'positive concomitance' and vyatireka as 'negative concomitance' when they are used as a pair.

How do you proceed?

On the translation of Sanskrit texts, see this post and this one.

Hindu-Christian and interreligious dialogue: has it any religious value?

Inter-religious dialogue is surely needed for political and sociological reasons. We prefer to be able to discuss, rather than dislike each other's cloths, food and rules of conduct, at the risk of ending up hating each other. However, is inter-religious dialogue also needed for religious reasons? Christians are used to the idea that they need to learn about Hebraism, since they depend so much on the Old Testament and its Hebrew interpretations. But what about Hindu-Christian or Buddhist-Christian or Muslim-Buddhist, etc., dialogue?

How can one theologically justify inter-religious dialogue? In his Comparative Theology, Francis Xavier Clooney mentions a Vaiṣṇava verse, which, although not understood as such in its own tradition, could be used for this purpose:

Whichever form pleases his people, that is his form;
Whichever name pleases his people, that is his name;
Whichever way pleases his people who meditate without ceasing,
That is his way, the one who holds the discus.

Clooney comments:

As we love God, God adjusts and comes to us accordingly; if someone loves like a bride, God comes as a groom. […]

My hypothesis is that in contemplation we construct a path of religious belonging that suits our own spiritual imagining; we do this according to our traditions but also the possibilities available in our time and place. In all of this, God agrees to meet us there; if our contemplation happens to cross religious boundaries, God agrees to meet us there too (p. 130). 

Do you agree? Has inter-religious dialogue a religious value (and/or justification)? Or is it just a dangerous new-age-like "supermarket of religions"?

On Comparative Theology by F.X. Clooney, see this post.

Kumārila's commentators

Kumārila's Ślokavārttika has been commented several times. The main three commentators are

• Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa
• Sucarita Miśra
• Pārthasāsathi Miśra

DATE
Uṃveka was possibly a direct disciple of Kumārila and is surely the most ancient commentator. As for Sucarita and Pārthasārathi, they surely lived several centuries thereafter. Their relative chronology is under discussion. The two share a lot which is distinctive to them and not borrowed from Uṃveka. Personally (see an article by me on Kumārila's commentators published on Sambhāṣā in 2008) I am inclined to think that Sucarita is the source of Pārthasārathi.

PHILOSOPHICAL VALUE
Uṃveka is original and interesting in approach and seems to be the most philosophically interesting author (which also means that he might not be completely reliable as for the interpretation of Kumārila's thought, as shown by John Taber in regard to the thesis of svataḥ prāmāṇya). The edition of Uṃveka has the text of Kumārila reproduced on the top, but the text has been added by the editor and needs not be exactly the same which Uṃveka had before his eyes.

This last remark applies even more to Sucarita. In his case one often has the feeling (at least, I do) that he might have had a different text before his eyes. I enjoy reading Sucarita, since he seems to me to offer a good balance between philosophical acumen and adherence to the text.

Pārthasārathi is the most useful commentator as for understanding Kumārila's text in itself but one hardly finds any new idea elaborated by him (and not already traceable in Sucarita).

EXTENSION OF THE COMMENTARY
Pārthasārathi's commentary is the only one which has been completely published. Sucarita's commentary is possibly complete (Taisei Shida is currently editing the unedited portions), but has only been partially published (see the etext of the available part here). Uṃveka's commentary is, so far, incomplete.
Thus we have:
—Uṃveka covering from the beginning to the sphoṭa section (i.e., covering MS 1.1.1, MS 1.1.2, MS 1.1.3, MS 1.1.4, and the following sections out of MS 1.1.5: vṛttikāragrantha, nirālambanavāda, śūnyavāda, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti, abhāva, citrākṣepa-sambandhākṣepa, sphoṭavāda).
—Sucarita covering from the beginning to almost the end of the citrākṣepa section.
—Pārthasārathi covering the whole Ślokavārttika.

(this post has been prompted by a question by Sudipta Munsi.)

Which one do you know and use?

"Seeing" what is not there: a fake? What about Buddhism and Jainism, then?

Can one access something new through visualization (bhāvanā) or meditation?

If not, then the Buddha and the other human beings who established a new religion by claiming that they had a particular access to dharma (/God's will/etc.) are a fake.
But how to distinguish the case of the Buddha and of other extra-ordinary beings from that of cheats? The Mīmāṃsā arguments against the access to dharma through visualization or meditation seem quite strong, as they rely on the fact that what is "seen" is in fact only "remembered", and on the fact that sense-faculties have fixed boundaries and super-sensuous elements exceed them.

As for the first point, consider the following passage by Veṅkaṭanātha (Seśvaramīmāṃsā ad MS 1.1.4):

Out of visualisation it is not perception which arises, but rather only clearness of memory. In fact, the accumulation of mnestic traces (saṃskāra) can supply sharpness only to memory. Even when, for instance, a love-sick sees his [absent] beloved one, nothing additional to what has already been known appears [in his image of her].

And the additional element appearing in "And on every tree I see Rāma, clothed  with the skin of an antelope and a garment, with his arch, holding a noose in his hand like the Destroyer (Yāma)" (Rāmāyaṇa 3.37.1512) and similar [verses], is not directly perceivable, since it appears in a different way (i.e., as a tree, not as Rāma). What [is directly perceivable] is, instead, its external look (i.e., the tree). (That is, the fact that Rāma appears on every tree and in Yāma's garb is not directly perceived —through direct perception one would see trees as trees).

Do you see a different way to "save" Buddhism, Jainism, etc., while yet not accepting all sorts of claims about super-natural access to dharma, etc.?

On yogipratyakṣa (sense-perception of extra-sensory items, such as dharma), see this post (and the further list of links on its bottom).

General rules regarding the re-use of texts (Part 1): Jain peculiarities?

During the last Coffee Break Meeting, we had some time to share ideas and compare results in our investigations on the re-use of texts in Indian śāstras. What do you think about the following points?

1. 1) Almost everything is of foreign nature in the Objector (Pūrvapakṣa), whereas much more is the author's own voice in the Conclusive reply (Siddhānta) (I owe this point to Himal Trikha). I had the same feeling while reading Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Is this only a Jaina-Buddhist practice? Did you ever find evidence of the opposite? 
2. 2) What is typical of Jains, and why? Does the anekāntavāda lead to more quotations, more respect to the others and hence, acknowledgement, appreciative, value of the author? If the anekāntavāda plays no role in this respect, why is it the case that Jains preserve more manuscripts (and seem to have embedded more texts into their own)? Has this anything to do with the fact of living in a monastery, and —thus— having a library at disposal? Or with the minor emphasis on the absolute value of memorization and oral knowledge?

On the last Coffee Break Metting, see this post (for my introduction) and this wiki-page (for program, abstracts and other materials).

What is Philosophy? Roger Scruton's "A short history of modern philosophy. From Descartes to Wittgenstein"

My long term goal is to make Indian philosophy part of philosophy tout-court. For this goal to be achieved, however, one needs at least two basic attitudes to come true:

1. 1. an interest in what one does not know. If you think that what you already know is enough, you will not start reading about Indian philosophy. But then, I wonder, are you really a philosopher? Or not, rather, a dogmatic custodian of your relics?
2. 2. a historical interest. If you think that the only philosophical points worth investigating are the fashionable ones, you will probably not be interested in classical Indian philosophy (and you will, hence, probably neglect also contemporary Indian philosophy). But then, again, are you really a philosopher? Or not rather a fashion-victim?

Thus, when I read introductory books on philosophical topics I check for these two requisites.
Roger Scruton is a well-known author and a very celebrated one (5 stars on Amazon, better than David Hume, who has only 4!). Unfortunately, he lacks both requisites.

Scruton's style is nice and his book can be read as if it were a novel and I guess that this is the reason of his success. However, I need to warn readers about his choices, which are biased against whatever he does not like, which he does not even try to understand.

1) As for India properly said, Scruton reconstruct the history of philosophy only through what he knows. In the case of Schopenhauer, for instance, the influence of the Upaniṣads, though explicit, is just not mentioned. Scruton seems to think that whatever he does not know, is not worth knowing. A book like that can be enjoyed and be profitable, but it is NOT a "history", since it gives not enough historical elements.

2) His choices in the TOC: the book has 5 parts, one dedicated to Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz; one dedicated to Empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume); one dedicated to "Kant and idealism" (Kant, Hegel and a small chapter on Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche); one dedicated to Political philosophy (Hobbes, Hegel, Marx, Utilitarianism); one dedicated to "Recent philosophy" (Frege, "Phenomenology and existentialism", Wittgenstein"). Heidegger is not worth a mention in the TOC, nor is Husserl (not to speak about Gadamer, Ricoeur [not even mentioned], Bergson [not even mentioned], Russell and so on). Frege gained, by contrast, a whole chapter… Bah!

3) The author clearly does not stand Heidegger ("Looked at critically, Heidegger's ideas seem like spectral visions in the realm of thought; vast, intangible shadows cast by language […] This sort of philosophy shows, in Wittgenstein's words, 'the bewitchment of the intelligence by means of language'", p. 261). Nor can he tolerate anything which he does not understand. And his opinion on what he does not understand is quite clear: If he does not understand it, it is in itself not understandable ("In the next chapter I shall give reasons for thinking that it [Heidegger's work] may be unintelligible", p. 256). And its author is guilty of it. For instance, his claim that "Heidegger does not give any argument for the truth of what he says" and that his is not philosophy, but a "private spiritual journey" (p. 260) disregards the connection of Husserl and Heidegger and the rigour Heidegger inherited from his teacher.

4) The same applies to Scruton on Sartre ("This [Heidegger's] lack of argument persists in the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre", p. 261), Merleau-Ponty ("The result [of Merleau-Ponty's work] has been a mass of phenomenological lore. I call it lore […] because of the impossibility of ascertaining its intellectual status", p. 266) and many other philosophers.

5) Consider the following statement, which is the closing one of the whole book: "Much has changed in philosophy since Wittgenstein produced his arguments. One thing is certain, however. The assumption that there is first-person certainty, which provides a starting-point for philosophical enquiry, this assumption which led to the rationalism of Descartes and to the empiricism of Hume, to so much of modern epistemology and so much of modern metaphysics, has been finally removed from the centre of philosophy. The ambition of Kant and Hegel, to achieve a philosophy which removes the ‘self’ from the beginning of knowledge so as to return it in an enriched and completed form at the end, has perhaps now been fulfilled" (p. 279). Thus, Wittgenstein solved the problems created by Descartes and Hume, the same problems which Kant and Hegel had failed to solve… Bah!


SUMMING UP: An experienced reader will immediately notice that the author has peculiar tastes. This is fine, but unexperienced readers must be warned about them, in order to be aware that this book is NOT "A short history of Modern Philosophy", but rather "A short summary of those authors of Modern Philosophy whom Scruton liked and understood, with a few degorative pages on the others".

Have you read this book? Do you have any other suggestion concerning scholars of philosophy who have authored (introductory) books and are more open towards (Indian) philosophy?

The names of Gaṅgā: a critical edition of a nāmastotra

I just read "The Thousands name of Gaṅgā" (I mille nomi di Gaṅgā) by Laura Liberale. The first part of the book recounts the myths about Gaṅgā, whereas the second is an Italian translation of the Gaṅgāsahasranāmastotra ('the hymn of the thousands names of the Gaṅgā', a list of thousand names of Gaṅgā, in alphabetic order and with no further notation) of the Skandapurāṇa. The translation is followed by an appendix reporting the Sanskrit text of the 1908-9 edition  of the Skandapurāṇa, together with variants found in twenty manuscripts.
The author notes:

1. 1) that H.T. Bakker (working on the critical edition of "the most ancient edition of the Skandapurāṇa", dated "to the VIII or even VI c.") told her that the Gaṅgāsahasranāmastotra is not present in this "original" version (p. 195).
2. 2) that, "therefore", "this stotra does not seem to precede the XIII-XIV c." (p. 195). 

I am not sure that 2) follows from 1), although the author might have additional reasons she does not mention here, i.e., the chronology of nāmastotras (hymns listing names) in general. But, if so, the absence of the Gaṅgāsahasranāmastotra from the ancient version of the Skandapurāṇa edited in Groningen does not seem to add much.

1. 3) Next, she notes that the text has been handed down "with a extraordinary honogeneity of sources" (i.e., with little variants). 

However, the twenty manuscripts are all manuscripts of the Gaṅgāsahasranāmastotra, separated from the Skandapurāṇa, they are all written on paper and in Devanāgarī. Moreover, 12 out of 20 come from the same library (Indira Gandhi National Centre), 2 come from Poona (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute), 2 from Trivandrum (Oriental Research Institute), 1 from Kerala (Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library) and 2 from the on-line archives of the university of Pennsylvania. I wonder whether the uniformity depends only on the relatively recent age of the text (do you know of recent religious texts with many variants?) or on the particular manuscripts examined, which might all be related. Unfortunately, the author does not attempt a stemma codicum, nor does she explain how representative is the number of manuscripts examined, if compared to the total amount of manuscripts of the same text.

1. 4) The author writes (p. 12) that she has found and examined all manuscripts. 

Why are the data (such as number of pages, lines per page…) missing in the case of the manuscripts from the BORI and from Trivandrum?

This being said, the section about manuscript is rightly called an "appendix" and readers immediately understand that the author cares much more for the content of the Gaṅgāsahasranāmastotra and for its focus on the feminine aspect of the Divine.

 A couple of general questions:
—What do you think of the possibility of critical editions of nāmastotras?
—Does it make sense to collect variants, if one is not interested in a complete recensio, nor in a genealogy of manuscripts? Please remember that life is short and the time spent in doing X is time one is not dedicating to Y.

On the need of priorities, see this post. For my review of this book on Amazon.it. click here.

New Year's Indological Projects

What do you plan to achieve in 2013?

I have already described my goals in this post, but here are my plans concerning the next twelve months.
My 2013 project: finish the translation of the first book of the Seśvaramīmāṃsā by Veṅkaṭanātha, study of it and of its manuscripts. To this are added, month by month, the following smaller projects:

January: Finishing my volume on tantra and prasaṅga. Paper on paribhāṣās in Mīmāṃsā (for a volume on paribhāṣās edited by Gianni Pellegrini). Working on my volume on Quotations (proceedings of this conference).
February: Paper on paribhāṣās in Mīmāṃsā. Volume on Quotations. Finishing the paper on meaning and reference in Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, book 5 (with Artemij Keidan).
March: Paper on nature in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā (for a conference in Rome organized by Raffaele Torella). Volume on Quotations. Paper on meaning and reference in Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, book 5.
April: Finishing my book on Testimony in Indian philosophy. Launching the new version of this blog.
May: Finishing my book on Testimony in Indian philosophy.
June: Paper on Veṅkaṭanātha and Rāmānujācārya on the study of Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā.
July: (holiday +) Paper on Veṅkaṭanātha and Rāmānujācārya on the study of Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā.
August: CBC conference on Testimony in Philosophy (see here).
September: CBC conference on Testimony in Philosophy. Correcting the first drafts of the volume on Quotations.
October: Paper on Veṅkaṭanātha and Śrī Rāmānuja on the study of Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā.
November: (no further projects yet)
December: (no further projects yet)

In case you want to feel accountable for your scholar commitments, please add a comment below.

For my more general goals, see this post.