Since Mīmāṃsā (both in its Bhāṭṭa
and in its Prābhākara subschools) focused primarily on the exegesis of
the prescriptive portion of the Vedic Sacred Texts, the Mīmāṃsā texts
offer richly developed discussions of deontic issues, both from a
linguistic and from a logic point of view. Unfortunately, the lack of
philosophically accessible translations has made most of such
discussions remain confined to Sanskritists. Please read the rest at my new blog, here.
Showing posts with label Prābhākara. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prābhākara. Show all posts
Thursday, April 10, 2014
Friday, November 15, 2013
Yoshimizu, apūrva and a new reading of the Mīmāṃsā schools
There are various differences among the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara
schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, respectively founded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and
Prabhākara Miśra, who possibly lived around the 7th c. AD, but one of
the most striking and telling ones is that regarding the concept of apūrva.
Read the rest at my new blog, here.
Read the rest at my new blog, here.
Friday, August 16, 2013
The context principle and some Indian controversies over Meaning —B.K. Matilal and P.K. Sen
The context principle and some Indian controversies over Meaning is a milestone in Indian studies, and in the history of their interaction with mainstream (i.e. Western) philosophy. Since it was published in 1988 on Mind (one of the top-5 journals in Philosophy, inaccessible for most authors), virtually everyone (in Indian philosophy) has read it.
Have you also re-read it?
I re-read it after some years this Summer and I have to admit that it was again a surprise. The article starts with a discussion of the Context principle in Frege and Quine (does the principle mean that words HAVE no meaning outside a sentence, or that their meaning can only be UNDERSTOOD within a sentence?). In this connection, M & S discuss a strong and a weak interpretation of the Context principle (according to whether it should answer the first or the second question). They end up saying that the strong interpretation clashes with Frege's later work (see below), whereas the weak interpretation (the context is only needed to understand the meaning of words) is trivial. Thus, an intermediate interpretation needs to be adopted, namely that "the meaning of a subsentential expression is nothing but its contribution to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs" (p. 80).
Next, Matilal and Sen discuss also Russell's On Denoting (another milestone of contemporary Philosophy of Language). I have to admit that I could not understand Matilal and Sen's treatment of it until I actually read Russell (but the fact of making a reader undertake further studies might be conceived as a further result of Matilal and Sen). Until M & S, in fact, I had always thought of Russell's philosophy of language as correspondentist, whereas M & S interpret Russell's strategy of reduction (through his "contextual definitions") as also (implicitly) presupposing some sort of Context principle.
A further step is the analysis of Frege. In fact, the Context principle seems to clash with the sense-reference distinction, outlined by Frege in his later work. M & S use Michael Dummett's Frege: Philosophy of Language to claim that both theses can co-exist: words' meanings are outer referents, but "we cannot say anything, in the strict sense of the word 'say', without the use of whole sentences" (p. 80). After a short excursus on Kant's unity of thought, Michael Dummett's book is also quoted to discuss the distinction between the Context principle and the Composition principle. According to the latter, the meaning of a sentence is the result of the composition of the words forming it.
Does this sound familiar? If not, it means that you have not been working on the Kumārila-Prabhākara-Bhartṛhari-Nyāya controversy on word- and sentence-meaning. In fact, as shown by M & S in the second part of their work (pp. 84--97), the Indian scenario also revolves on similar issues. Bhartṛhari is clearly an holist: for him the meaning of a sentence is a whole and word-meanings are only secondary abstractions. Kumārila and Prabhākara represent two different positions, possibly identifiable, respectively, with the weak and the intermediate interpretation of the Context principle.
This leads to a further problem, i.e., the link between linguistics and ontology. The topic is only hinted at at the end of M & S's article, but it is, in my opinion, the most thought-provoking contribution of the article (together with the very idea of joining Frege and Kumārila side by side in a philosophical debate).
In fact, if words express their meanings only once already related in the context of a sentence, as upheld by the Prābhākaras, what consequences does this have for the Prābhākara ontology? If, for instance, "cow" in "Bring the cow!" does not mean a separate cow, but a cow insofar as it is related to the injunction of being brought, does this entail that a "cow-connected-with-the-injunction-of bringing" exists out there? What sort of cow would this be? Surely an incomplete cow, one which is completed by the injunction of bringing. Should one admit —for the sake of maintaining the correspondentism between meanings and outer world— that there are "unsaturated entities" out there?
My personal answer is that ontology is less relevant than linguistics for the Prābhākaras (unlike for most Western philosophers and common folks) and that, as a matter of fact, this sort of correspondentism is already ruled out by the Prābhākara stress on exhortations as the paradigm of all sentences.
What do you think? Can there be linguistics without ontology?
Moreover, methodologically speaking, I wonder why M & S has not been enough for further studies of this sort to be the rule on Mind (and other philosophical journals). Does this failure depend on their style? (Or should we just start working as a task-force and submit many articles of this kind?)
On ontology and Mīmāṃsā, see this post. On ontology in Indian philosophy in general, see this one.
As hinted at in the Introduction, this was not the first time I read M & S's article. You can read a further post about it (focusing on the Prābhākara linguistic theory) here. On Frege's and the Prābhākara philosophy of language, check this post.
Have you also re-read it?
I re-read it after some years this Summer and I have to admit that it was again a surprise. The article starts with a discussion of the Context principle in Frege and Quine (does the principle mean that words HAVE no meaning outside a sentence, or that their meaning can only be UNDERSTOOD within a sentence?). In this connection, M & S discuss a strong and a weak interpretation of the Context principle (according to whether it should answer the first or the second question). They end up saying that the strong interpretation clashes with Frege's later work (see below), whereas the weak interpretation (the context is only needed to understand the meaning of words) is trivial. Thus, an intermediate interpretation needs to be adopted, namely that "the meaning of a subsentential expression is nothing but its contribution to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs" (p. 80).
Next, Matilal and Sen discuss also Russell's On Denoting (another milestone of contemporary Philosophy of Language). I have to admit that I could not understand Matilal and Sen's treatment of it until I actually read Russell (but the fact of making a reader undertake further studies might be conceived as a further result of Matilal and Sen). Until M & S, in fact, I had always thought of Russell's philosophy of language as correspondentist, whereas M & S interpret Russell's strategy of reduction (through his "contextual definitions") as also (implicitly) presupposing some sort of Context principle.
A further step is the analysis of Frege. In fact, the Context principle seems to clash with the sense-reference distinction, outlined by Frege in his later work. M & S use Michael Dummett's Frege: Philosophy of Language to claim that both theses can co-exist: words' meanings are outer referents, but "we cannot say anything, in the strict sense of the word 'say', without the use of whole sentences" (p. 80). After a short excursus on Kant's unity of thought, Michael Dummett's book is also quoted to discuss the distinction between the Context principle and the Composition principle. According to the latter, the meaning of a sentence is the result of the composition of the words forming it.
Does this sound familiar? If not, it means that you have not been working on the Kumārila-Prabhākara-Bhartṛhari-Nyāya controversy on word- and sentence-meaning. In fact, as shown by M & S in the second part of their work (pp. 84--97), the Indian scenario also revolves on similar issues. Bhartṛhari is clearly an holist: for him the meaning of a sentence is a whole and word-meanings are only secondary abstractions. Kumārila and Prabhākara represent two different positions, possibly identifiable, respectively, with the weak and the intermediate interpretation of the Context principle.
This leads to a further problem, i.e., the link between linguistics and ontology. The topic is only hinted at at the end of M & S's article, but it is, in my opinion, the most thought-provoking contribution of the article (together with the very idea of joining Frege and Kumārila side by side in a philosophical debate).
In fact, if words express their meanings only once already related in the context of a sentence, as upheld by the Prābhākaras, what consequences does this have for the Prābhākara ontology? If, for instance, "cow" in "Bring the cow!" does not mean a separate cow, but a cow insofar as it is related to the injunction of being brought, does this entail that a "cow-connected-with-the-injunction-of bringing" exists out there? What sort of cow would this be? Surely an incomplete cow, one which is completed by the injunction of bringing. Should one admit —for the sake of maintaining the correspondentism between meanings and outer world— that there are "unsaturated entities" out there?
My personal answer is that ontology is less relevant than linguistics for the Prābhākaras (unlike for most Western philosophers and common folks) and that, as a matter of fact, this sort of correspondentism is already ruled out by the Prābhākara stress on exhortations as the paradigm of all sentences.
What do you think? Can there be linguistics without ontology?
Moreover, methodologically speaking, I wonder why M & S has not been enough for further studies of this sort to be the rule on Mind (and other philosophical journals). Does this failure depend on their style? (Or should we just start working as a task-force and submit many articles of this kind?)
On ontology and Mīmāṃsā, see this post. On ontology in Indian philosophy in general, see this one.
As hinted at in the Introduction, this was not the first time I read M & S's article. You can read a further post about it (focusing on the Prābhākara linguistic theory) here. On Frege's and the Prābhākara philosophy of language, check this post.
Friday, August 9, 2013
Testimony and Credit
If one accepts testimony among the instruments of knowledge, then one is forced to reconsider one's idea of the role of credit within knowledge. In fact, in the virtue-epistemology understanding of knowledge, this can be "credited" to the knower. However, in the case of testimony, the credit seems to be little in the case of the listener and to rather regard the speaker ---who is not the "knower" of a testimonial belief.
Is there any possible way out?
This debate lies at the center of Jennifer Lackey's Knowledge and Credit (2009, available through Jstor at this link), and of a broader discussion possibly initiated by Lackey 2007. Lackey 2009 discusses the case of a tourist (called Morris) coming in Chicago and asking for directions. He happens to ask a Chiacago resident who gives him exact directions. Morris now knows where the Sears Towers are, although he deserves no credit for that!
—If one says that Morris does not know where the Sears Towers are, then one has to leave out of "knowledge" most cases of testimony.
—By contrast, one might try to say that Morris does deserve some credit (for instance, insofar as he asked a sober adult, instead of a child, an intoxicated person, etc.). However, Lackey explains, if this is the case, then credit should be granted also to "knowers" in Gettier-cases,
e.g., to Jack who has reasons to believe that his colleague John has 10 coins in his pocket and will get an advancement and as a consequence truly believes that someone in the room has 10 coins in his pocket and will get an advancement, although the one who has 10 coins and will get an advancement is Jack himself and not his colleague (you can find enough literature on Edmund Gettier, but since his article is only 3 pages long, the best way is just to read it, here),
although the Credit View of Knowledge should exactly aim at distinguishing knowledge (justified true belief) from beliefs which are only accidentally true (i.e., Gettier-cases).
Lackey shows how all attempts to reconfigure the role of Credit to meet the Chicago Visitor case are deemed to fail (or to include Gettier-like cases). Among these attempts are the idea (see E. Sosa 2007) that Credit can be shared (for instance, by speaker and hearer).
Unfortunately, Lackey does not spell out in her 2009 article the consequences of the dismissal of the Credit view of knowledge. Will this lead to a new paradigm (where true beliefs are knowledge, no matter whether they are justified or not)? Or will it just force epistemologists to find a new way to distinguish between knowledge and accidentally true beliefs?
The discussion has some special impact for scholars focusing chiefly on Indian philosophy and for readers of this blog in particular. One notices 1) the role of the listener within testimony, already highlighted on this blog (see below), 2) the conundrum implied in the case of testimony: Either one accepts only "safe" cases of testimony (notably the Veda, in the case of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā), or the acceptance of testimony risks to lead to the acceptance of Gettier-like cases as well, 3) the similarity between virtue-epistemology and parataḥ prāmāṇya in placing the additional element of knowledge over true belief on the knower (and not on the piece of knowledge itself). Last, you might remember the articles by Sibajiban Bhattacharya arguing that in India (which meant, for him, Navya Nyāya) there is no need for a true belief to be also justified to count as knowledge. Gettier-like cases are also discussed and accepted as knowledge.
Does the Indian approach just deny the importance of the listener's competence? Does the burden only rely on the source of Linguistic Communication? And, more in general, do we need credit?
Further discussions on similar contacts between testimony and Gettier cases can be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, here. On the role of the listener, see here and here.
Is there any possible way out?
This debate lies at the center of Jennifer Lackey's Knowledge and Credit (2009, available through Jstor at this link), and of a broader discussion possibly initiated by Lackey 2007. Lackey 2009 discusses the case of a tourist (called Morris) coming in Chicago and asking for directions. He happens to ask a Chiacago resident who gives him exact directions. Morris now knows where the Sears Towers are, although he deserves no credit for that!
—If one says that Morris does not know where the Sears Towers are, then one has to leave out of "knowledge" most cases of testimony.
—By contrast, one might try to say that Morris does deserve some credit (for instance, insofar as he asked a sober adult, instead of a child, an intoxicated person, etc.). However, Lackey explains, if this is the case, then credit should be granted also to "knowers" in Gettier-cases,
e.g., to Jack who has reasons to believe that his colleague John has 10 coins in his pocket and will get an advancement and as a consequence truly believes that someone in the room has 10 coins in his pocket and will get an advancement, although the one who has 10 coins and will get an advancement is Jack himself and not his colleague (you can find enough literature on Edmund Gettier, but since his article is only 3 pages long, the best way is just to read it, here),
although the Credit View of Knowledge should exactly aim at distinguishing knowledge (justified true belief) from beliefs which are only accidentally true (i.e., Gettier-cases).
Lackey shows how all attempts to reconfigure the role of Credit to meet the Chicago Visitor case are deemed to fail (or to include Gettier-like cases). Among these attempts are the idea (see E. Sosa 2007) that Credit can be shared (for instance, by speaker and hearer).
Unfortunately, Lackey does not spell out in her 2009 article the consequences of the dismissal of the Credit view of knowledge. Will this lead to a new paradigm (where true beliefs are knowledge, no matter whether they are justified or not)? Or will it just force epistemologists to find a new way to distinguish between knowledge and accidentally true beliefs?
The discussion has some special impact for scholars focusing chiefly on Indian philosophy and for readers of this blog in particular. One notices 1) the role of the listener within testimony, already highlighted on this blog (see below), 2) the conundrum implied in the case of testimony: Either one accepts only "safe" cases of testimony (notably the Veda, in the case of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā), or the acceptance of testimony risks to lead to the acceptance of Gettier-like cases as well, 3) the similarity between virtue-epistemology and parataḥ prāmāṇya in placing the additional element of knowledge over true belief on the knower (and not on the piece of knowledge itself). Last, you might remember the articles by Sibajiban Bhattacharya arguing that in India (which meant, for him, Navya Nyāya) there is no need for a true belief to be also justified to count as knowledge. Gettier-like cases are also discussed and accepted as knowledge.
Does the Indian approach just deny the importance of the listener's competence? Does the burden only rely on the source of Linguistic Communication? And, more in general, do we need credit?
Further discussions on similar contacts between testimony and Gettier cases can be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, here. On the role of the listener, see here and here.
Friday, May 31, 2013
Absence in Ontology and Epistemology: a new article
Nirmalya Guha has just published on the Journal of Indian Philosophy (2013, no. 41) an interesting article about "An Onto-Epistemic Analysis of Absence". Guha's article is clear and well-written and nicely separates ontology and epistemology. The ontological question about absence (abhāva) is, in Guha's formulation,
Last, he offers his own support to the Prābhākara view that absences are not ontologically different from their locus and that no separate epistemic tool is required to know them. In fact, he explains, the absence of X is real, but at the ontological level it is nothing but the presence of Y, W, Z. And for him "making ontology is making an inventory of the world. And my claim is that such an inventory does not need any absence". As for the epistemic question, no further instrument of knowledge is required, agrees Guha, although a further psychological process is in fact needed, to shift from one's perception of the floor to one's cognition of the absence of the pot on it. But, as with Prābhākaras, "Since no epistemic instruments capture x —rather they fail to capture x— when the subject cognises that 'x is absent from y', the cognition of absence is not caused by any epistemic factor. […] But cognizing absence is an introspection of some sort" (p. 127).
If you think that Guha's denial of a separate instrument of knowledge for seizing absences is parasitic on the denial of an ontological existence of absences, I think you are right. Guha argues as follows:
A different perspective is Kumārila's, according to whom absences do not exist ontologically as separate state of affairs, but are a modality seized by a distinct instrument of knowledge (the one which enables us to notice "my glasses are not on the desk!" instead of just seeing the desk's surface).
Is an absence ontologically different from its locus?Whereas the epistemic question is:
Does a separate epistemic tool (pramāṇa) other than sense organs apprehend an absence?Further, Guha draws a nice table summarizing the answers of Nyāya and of Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā to the two questions.
Last, he offers his own support to the Prābhākara view that absences are not ontologically different from their locus and that no separate epistemic tool is required to know them. In fact, he explains, the absence of X is real, but at the ontological level it is nothing but the presence of Y, W, Z. And for him "making ontology is making an inventory of the world. And my claim is that such an inventory does not need any absence". As for the epistemic question, no further instrument of knowledge is required, agrees Guha, although a further psychological process is in fact needed, to shift from one's perception of the floor to one's cognition of the absence of the pot on it. But, as with Prābhākaras, "Since no epistemic instruments capture x —rather they fail to capture x— when the subject cognises that 'x is absent from y', the cognition of absence is not caused by any epistemic factor. […] But cognizing absence is an introspection of some sort" (p. 127).
If you think that Guha's denial of a separate instrument of knowledge for seizing absences is parasitic on the denial of an ontological existence of absences, I think you are right. Guha argues as follows:
- 1. no absence exists
- 2. instruments of knowledge only grasp existing things
- 3. thus, no distinct instrument of knowledge for absence exists
A different perspective is Kumārila's, according to whom absences do not exist ontologically as separate state of affairs, but are a modality seized by a distinct instrument of knowledge (the one which enables us to notice "my glasses are not on the desk!" instead of just seeing the desk's surface).
Monday, May 20, 2013
Does one study out of desire? Aristotle and Veṅkaṭanātha
A brahman must learn by heart the Veda and study its auxiliaries (metrics, astrology —to know when to perform a certain ritual—, etc.). But does he have to also dwell in it and investigate further beyond its sheer phonic form? And, if there is no duty to do it, why do people nonetheless start studying Mīmāṃsā (defined as the study of the meaning of the Veda)? Veṅkaṭanātha's answer, in his Seśvaramīmāṃsā (ad MS 1.1.1) and in the Śatadūṣaṇī is clear: out of desire (rāga). He thus replies to opponents who claim that the duty to learn the Veda extends beyond its phonic form and includes the Mīmāṃsā. Thus, Aristotle's approach ("Human beings naturally love to know") triumphs and the stereotype of an Indian adversion to desire is —once again— to be at least rediscussed:
Thus, desire is legitimate and legitimated, even within Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta…
For further posts on Veṅkaṭanātha see this one (and its links).
To begin with, the study of the whole Veda, together with its auxiliaries and with the Brahmasūtra is established, be it promoted by the injunction to study (as claimed by the Bhāṭṭas) or by the one to teach (as claimed by the Prābhākaras). Also the investigation about its meaning regards the whole [Veda], be it promoted by an injunction (as claimed by the Bhāṭṭas) or by one's desire (as explained in the Seśvaramīmāṃsā), since there is nothing hindering the one or the other (injunction or desire).
[Objection:] There might well be no hindrance to the promotion [of the study of the meaning of the Veda] by a prescription, but there is certainly a hindrance to the promotion by [one's] desire [to know the meaning of the Veda], because it is incongruous that one undertakes an activity as long as there is desire.
[Reply:] It is not so, because both the [following] options (vikalpa) are not possible: Is [desire to know it] an hindrance in the investigation about the brahman, or is it [an hindrance in the investigation] about ritual action (karman)? Not the first one, because a human being desires all four human aims (i.e., pleasure, success, dharma and liberation) [and not just the first three], and because there is no contradiction if, in [their] sequence, one [also] enjoys [them]. […]
(Śatadūṣaṇī 3)
Thus, desire is legitimate and legitimated, even within Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta…
For further posts on Veṅkaṭanātha see this one (and its links).
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
Next Sanskrit-Philosophical projects
Do you have just goals you can achieve by yourself? If not, here are my current projects, to which you are welcome to contribute. I will regularly update this post and add your names, if you desire to join and to be mentioned. Please consider that only the first six have been already undertaken:
- 1. Quotations and re-use of texts in Sanskrit śāstra. I have been working on this topic for several years and am about to chair a Coffee Break Conference about it (see here). The contributions will appear, if approved by the reviewers, in a special issue of the Journal of Indian Philosophy. I am now considering broadening the field to quotations and re-use of texts in Indian literature, including Veda, Belles Lettres and manuscript usages.
- 2. Coffee Break Conferences, i.e., conferences which are only meant for discussing and without read papers. We organize CBC once or twice a year, on several topics. You can read about the next projects on this website.
- 3. A panel on Testimony: I and the other two organisers welcome contributions on śabdapramāṇa in several fields, i.e., seen from the legal and philosophical point of view, in India and outside India. Further details can be read here.
- 4. Editions and translations: Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, book 5; Veṅkaṭanātha's Seśvaramīmāṃsā, Prabhākara's Bṛhatī, Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya.
- 5. Finishing my study on vidhi, apūrva, niyama, in Grammar, Dharmaśāstra and Mīmāṃsā.
- 6. A reader on śabdapramāṇa in Indian and Western philosophy. NB: I have already written a book about it in Italian and it would be great if one could add translations of key texts in favour or against Linguistic Communication as an Instrument of Knowledge.
- 7. A textbook about how to translate śāstric Sanskrit (along the lines of Tubb and Boose's Scholastic Sanskrit), which should ideally include chapters on Reading śāstric Sanskrit (with textual examples and tutorials) and on the specific issues related to translation. For a blurb, see this post.
- 8. A collective volume on Mīmāṃsā as a sāmānyaśāstra (i.e., on Mīmāṃsā rules and ideas as found outside Mīmāṃsā).
- 9. A collective volume on Scholastic texts, i.e., on post-classical śāstric texts, e.g., on the struggle of doing philosophy after Kumārila, Dharmakīrti, Śaṅkara, etc., trying to balance innovation and strategies for preserving what is already there.
Saturday, November 3, 2012
My book on Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā has been just released!
The book is an introduction to key concepts of Indian Philosophy, seen from the perspective of one of its most influential schools, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, which flourished from the 7th until the 20th c. AD. The book includes the edition and translation of Rāmānujācārya's Śāstraprameyapariccheda, which is part of his Tantrarahasya (written in South India, after the 14th c.). The edition is based on the extant editions, an additional manuscript and most of all on a huge amount of the texts which have been Rāmānujācārya's sources. The Tantrarahasya has never been translated before and it is one of the clearest elaboration of the Prābhākara thought. Within it, the Śāstraprameyapariccheda focuses on the core content of the Veda in general (is it an exhortation? a duty? the fact that each sacrifice will bring you happiness, etc.?) and in particular (which hermeneutical rules should one implement while interpreting a Vedic passage?).
Monday, October 8, 2012
Sanskrit-philosophical reviews on Amazon
I will list here (presumably with frequent updates) the reviews I have posted on Amazon. The purpose is to present a short summary of the main good and weak points of a book, so that one can figure out whether to read it or not. Furthermore, I will discuss both "Indological" books and books on philosophy (without geographic boundaries). Who knows, maybe there are other readers out there whose interests are not confined to the arbitrarily chosen geographic boundaries of "India" or "Germany" etc.
Review of The Logic of Commands, by Nicholas Rescher (if you have followed my posts on prescriptions you will know why I picked it up. Rescher's attempt is in many ways comparable to Maṇḍana's way of reducing prescriptions to assertions).
Review of Reflexion und Ritual in der Pūrvamīmāṃsā, by Lars Göhler (a great book, one that is worth reading even if your German is rosty, if only you are interested in Mīmāṃsā and/or the Veda and/or Indian philosophy).
Review of Penser l'Autorité des Écritures, by Vincent Eltschinger (a wonderful attempt of explaining philosophy through history without becoming a reductionist or a Marxist).
Review of The Vākyārthamātṛkā of Śālikanātha Miśra, by Rajendra Nath Sharma (the first English translation of a fundamental text –unfortunately not flawless).
Review of Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing, by Kei Kataoka (just a great book by a great Mīmāṃsaka, reliable and insightful).
I have still not received convincing arguments against this project (for the problem of wasting one's time and risking to be hated, see this post). Can you think of other pros and cons? More in general: How would your choice of books look like, if you could open Amazon (or similar engines) and find a short and reliable review of any book you need?
For my posts on commands, check the tags "prescription" and "Maṇḍana". For my more detailed comments on Eltschinger's book, see this post and the ones directly following it. For further considerations on reviews in Amazon (etc.), see this post.
Review of The Logic of Commands, by Nicholas Rescher (if you have followed my posts on prescriptions you will know why I picked it up. Rescher's attempt is in many ways comparable to Maṇḍana's way of reducing prescriptions to assertions).
Review of Reflexion und Ritual in der Pūrvamīmāṃsā, by Lars Göhler (a great book, one that is worth reading even if your German is rosty, if only you are interested in Mīmāṃsā and/or the Veda and/or Indian philosophy).
Review of Penser l'Autorité des Écritures, by Vincent Eltschinger (a wonderful attempt of explaining philosophy through history without becoming a reductionist or a Marxist).
Review of The Vākyārthamātṛkā of Śālikanātha Miśra, by Rajendra Nath Sharma (the first English translation of a fundamental text –unfortunately not flawless).
Review of Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing, by Kei Kataoka (just a great book by a great Mīmāṃsaka, reliable and insightful).
I have still not received convincing arguments against this project (for the problem of wasting one's time and risking to be hated, see this post). Can you think of other pros and cons? More in general: How would your choice of books look like, if you could open Amazon (or similar engines) and find a short and reliable review of any book you need?
For my posts on commands, check the tags "prescription" and "Maṇḍana". For my more detailed comments on Eltschinger's book, see this post and the ones directly following it. For further considerations on reviews in Amazon (etc.), see this post.
Friday, October 5, 2012
abhihitānvayavāda, anvitābhidhānavādaś ca
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शब्दस्यार्थो वाच्य इत्युच्यते । यः शब्दो ऽर्थमभिदधाित, सो वाचक इत्युच्यते ।
एकस्मिन् वाक्ये ऽनेकानि पदानि सन्ति । तानि पदान्यर्थवचकानि इति सर्वे मन्यन्ते, स्फोटवादिनो व्यतिरिच्य ।
अपि तु वाक्यमपि महात्वपूर्णमिति मीमांसकमतम्, यतो भिन्नेषु वाक्येष्वेकमेव पदम्भिन्नार्थेषु प्रयुज्यते । उदाहरणम् यथा -- स संस्कृतं पठति, स पुस्तकं पठति, यजको वेदं पठतीत्यादि ।
प्रथमवाक्यस्य "स संस्कृतभाषायां पुनः पुनरभ्यासं कृत्वा संस्कृतं ज्ञास्यति" इत्यर्थः । द्वितीयवाक्यस्यार्थः "स स्वार्थे पुस्तकं (ममसि) पठति" इति । त्रितीयवाक्यस्यार्थः "याजक उच्चैर्वेदम्पठति" इति ।
अतः "पठति" इतिपदमेकमेव, अर्थास्तु भिन्नाः । कस्मात्करणात् ?
एतस्य प्रश्नस्योत्तरदानार्थं मीमांसादर्शने वादद्वयम् अस्ति, अभिहितान्वयवादः, अन्विताभिदानवादश्चेति ।
मुख्यो ऽभिहितान्वयवादी कुमारिलभट्टः । मुख्यो ऽन्विताभिधानवादी प्राभकरः शालिकनाथमिश्रः ।
अभिहितान्वय इति समासस्य विग्रहः "अभिहितानामर्थानामन्वयः" इति । ये ऽर्थाः शब्दैरभिहिताः, तेषामन्वयः । वस्तुत एकमेकं पदमेकमेकमर्थमभिदधाति । अर्थमभिधाय पदानां को ऽपि प्रयोगो नास्ति यत अर्थानभिधायार्थानामन्वयो भवति । अन्वयः सम्बन्धः ।
अन्विताभिधान इति समासस्य विग्रहः "अन्वितैः पदैरभिधानम्" इति । पदानि परस्परसंबद्धान्येकमेवार्थमभिधाते । यथा "शुक्लां गां दण्डेनानय" इति वाक्ये शुकलामितिपदस्य विशिष्टार्थो नास्ति । केवलं संपूर्णवाक्यस्यार्थो ऽस्ति । यतः शुक्लामितिपदं गामितिपदास्यार्थं किंचित्परिणामयति । गामितिपदस्य सर्वदा सर्वेषु वाक्येष्वेक एवार्थो नास्ति । अन्यैः पदैर् गामितिपदस्यार्थपरिणामो भवति ।
एकस्मिन् वाक्ये ऽनेकानि पदानि सन्ति । तानि पदान्यर्थवचकानि इति सर्वे मन्यन्ते, स्फोटवादिनो व्यतिरिच्य ।
अपि तु वाक्यमपि महात्वपूर्णमिति मीमांसकमतम्, यतो भिन्नेषु वाक्येष्वेकमेव पदम्भिन्नार्थेषु प्रयुज्यते । उदाहरणम् यथा -- स संस्कृतं पठति, स पुस्तकं पठति, यजको वेदं पठतीत्यादि ।
प्रथमवाक्यस्य "स संस्कृतभाषायां पुनः पुनरभ्यासं कृत्वा संस्कृतं ज्ञास्यति" इत्यर्थः । द्वितीयवाक्यस्यार्थः "स स्वार्थे पुस्तकं (ममसि) पठति" इति । त्रितीयवाक्यस्यार्थः "याजक उच्चैर्वेदम्पठति" इति ।
अतः "पठति" इतिपदमेकमेव, अर्थास्तु भिन्नाः । कस्मात्करणात् ?
एतस्य प्रश्नस्योत्तरदानार्थं मीमांसादर्शने वादद्वयम् अस्ति, अभिहितान्वयवादः, अन्विताभिदानवादश्चेति ।
मुख्यो ऽभिहितान्वयवादी कुमारिलभट्टः । मुख्यो ऽन्विताभिधानवादी प्राभकरः शालिकनाथमिश्रः ।
अभिहितान्वय इति समासस्य विग्रहः "अभिहितानामर्थानामन्वयः" इति । ये ऽर्थाः शब्दैरभिहिताः, तेषामन्वयः । वस्तुत एकमेकं पदमेकमेकमर्थमभिदधाति । अर्थमभिधाय पदानां को ऽपि प्रयोगो नास्ति यत अर्थानभिधायार्थानामन्वयो भवति । अन्वयः सम्बन्धः ।
अन्विताभिधान इति समासस्य विग्रहः "अन्वितैः पदैरभिधानम्" इति । पदानि परस्परसंबद्धान्येकमेवार्थमभिधाते । यथा "शुक्लां गां दण्डेनानय" इति वाक्ये शुकलामितिपदस्य विशिष्टार्थो नास्ति । केवलं संपूर्णवाक्यस्यार्थो ऽस्ति । यतः शुक्लामितिपदं गामितिपदास्यार्थं किंचित्परिणामयति । गामितिपदस्य सर्वदा सर्वेषु वाक्येष्वेक एवार्थो नास्ति । अन्यैः पदैर् गामितिपदस्यार्थपरिणामो भवति ।
Friday, April 27, 2012
Why is Prabhākara hardly studied at all?
Of the scholar known as the “founder” of the school, Prabhākara Miśra, only one text (his Bṛhatī) is extant, and only a fraction of it has been edited and published. Before him, possible forerunners are known only because their names are sometimes quoted in other works. The lack of a satisfying edition of the Bṛhatī, together with its terse style, has made direct access to Prabhākara prohibitive to most scholars. In fact, even ancient Indian philosophers, though crediting Prabhākara with the “foundation” of the school, preferred to quote his commentator, Śālikanātha Miśra and the custom has continued ever since. Śālikanātha himself, though much clearer than Prabhākara, did not intend to convey the basic tenets of his school in an easy manner for the sake of non-Mīmāṃsakas. It is indeed not until a later time that Indian philosophers felt the need to compose easier abridgements of their schools’ doctrines. Instances of this kind of texts are the Bhāṭṭa Mānameyodaya or the Naiyāyika Tarkasaṅgraha, which are used even today as introductory manuals.
Thursday, April 12, 2012
Jayanta's Mīmāṃsā sources
Within Mīmāṃsā, the seminal Mīmāṃsāsūtra by Jaimini has been commented upon by Śabara in his Bhāṣya. Next, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa commented upon different portions of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Bhāṣya in four works, i.e., the Ślokavārttika, the lost Bṛhaṭṭīkā, the Tantravārttika and the Ṭupṭīkā. The general tendency in Sanskrit philosophy is to consider Kumārila or his interpreters as the final authority and to read Jaimini and Śabara through his lenses.
While working on a portion of Nyāyamañjarī 4 —the Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya— with Kei Kataoka, we could ascertain what follows as for his Mīmāṃsā sources. In an article, Alex Watson could detect a direct quote of Prabhākara and I would be glad to receive further hints concerning Jayanta's sources.
The main source of the Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya was the Tantravārttika commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.1-4, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (as already ascertained in Kataoka 2004). To Kumārila we could add the role of Śabara as direct source of Jayanta, since in several cases Jayanta prefers Śabara's interpretation over Kumārila's one. As hinted at above, this contradicts a general tendency and is hence of particular significance.
Beside Śabara and Kumārila, we could ascertain that Jayanta also relied on a source within the opposed branch of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, although it has not been possible to find an exact textual parallel in the work of Prabhākara Miśra or of his first commentator, Śālikanātha Miśra.
Does this mean that Jayanta could read the work of a Prābhākara author before Prabhākara?
On Jayanta in general, see this post.
While working on a portion of Nyāyamañjarī 4 —the Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya— with Kei Kataoka, we could ascertain what follows as for his Mīmāṃsā sources. In an article, Alex Watson could detect a direct quote of Prabhākara and I would be glad to receive further hints concerning Jayanta's sources.
The main source of the Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya was the Tantravārttika commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.1-4, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (as already ascertained in Kataoka 2004). To Kumārila we could add the role of Śabara as direct source of Jayanta, since in several cases Jayanta prefers Śabara's interpretation over Kumārila's one. As hinted at above, this contradicts a general tendency and is hence of particular significance.
Beside Śabara and Kumārila, we could ascertain that Jayanta also relied on a source within the opposed branch of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, although it has not been possible to find an exact textual parallel in the work of Prabhākara Miśra or of his first commentator, Śālikanātha Miśra.
Does this mean that Jayanta could read the work of a Prābhākara author before Prabhākara?
On Jayanta in general, see this post.
Sunday, March 18, 2012
Validity of Sacred Texts other than the Veda: the Mīmāṃsā approach
According to Mīmāṃsā authors, texts different than the Veda are reliable insofar as they are based on the Veda. But how can one demonstrate it? The demonstration is usually based on the application of cogent evidence (arthāpatti): The Dharmaśāstras have no other root than the Veda, hence they are based on the Veda. The background of this argument is Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.4 hetudarśanāc ca (''[Other texts are not valid] also in case one sees a reason [which could have lead someone to make them up, such as personal interest]''), which denies the validity of texts for which a different reason, such as greed or delusion, can be detected.
Thus, other texts are valid insofar as they are based on the Veda. This Veda-root may be, following Kumārila, either a branch of the Veda which is currently lost, or a compendium of Vedic elements which today's readers cannot recognise because they are scattered in various Vedic texts. Alternatively, the Vedic root might be the ''always inferred'' (nityānumeya) Veda, i.e., a Vedic text which is always inferrable, but has never existed as a directly perceivable texts. This claim is based on the idea that there have always been, without beginning, two sorts of Veda, one which is intrinsically available to direct perception (i.e., which can be heard) and one which is intrinsically only inferable.
In harmony with the Mīmāṃsā focus on what is currently the case, Prābhākaras do not postulate that the always inferable Veda was previously perceptible and has then at a certain point been lost. Rather, an ever inferable Veda must exist, since it inspires from time to time authors of valid texts such as the MDhŚā, but there is nothing which leads one to postulate that it has ever existed in a directly perceptible form. Tne Prābhākaras consider the two Vedas as being on the same level and say that the ever inferable one is inferred out of the proper conduct of good people or out of the fact that right Dharmaśāstras are composed.
The existence of this ever inferable Veda is one of the less-understood and more-criticised Prābhākara claims. Sheldon Pollock, for instance, makes fun of it in his The Language of Gods in the World of Men.
For the Mīmāṃā approach to the validity of the Veda, see this post.
Thus, other texts are valid insofar as they are based on the Veda. This Veda-root may be, following Kumārila, either a branch of the Veda which is currently lost, or a compendium of Vedic elements which today's readers cannot recognise because they are scattered in various Vedic texts. Alternatively, the Vedic root might be the ''always inferred'' (nityānumeya) Veda, i.e., a Vedic text which is always inferrable, but has never existed as a directly perceivable texts. This claim is based on the idea that there have always been, without beginning, two sorts of Veda, one which is intrinsically available to direct perception (i.e., which can be heard) and one which is intrinsically only inferable.
In harmony with the Mīmāṃsā focus on what is currently the case, Prābhākaras do not postulate that the always inferable Veda was previously perceptible and has then at a certain point been lost. Rather, an ever inferable Veda must exist, since it inspires from time to time authors of valid texts such as the MDhŚā, but there is nothing which leads one to postulate that it has ever existed in a directly perceptible form. Tne Prābhākaras consider the two Vedas as being on the same level and say that the ever inferable one is inferred out of the proper conduct of good people or out of the fact that right Dharmaśāstras are composed.
The existence of this ever inferable Veda is one of the less-understood and more-criticised Prābhākara claims. Sheldon Pollock, for instance, makes fun of it in his The Language of Gods in the World of Men.
For the Mīmāṃā approach to the validity of the Veda, see this post.
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
Mīmāṃsā standpoint on the validity of Sacred Texts
Indian thought knows basically two ways to justify the validity of the Sacred Texts: the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā one.
In synthesis, Mīmāṃsā authors argue in favour of the validity of the Veda due to the fact that it is the only instrument of knowledge through which one can know dharma. Mīmāṃsakas divide in fact what can be known into two precincts, on the one hand common experience, which encompasses what can be known through sense-perception and the other instruments of knowledge (inference, analogy and cogent evidence, to which Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors only add absence), which ultimately depend on perceptual data. On the other hand there is dharma, which cannot be known through sense-perception and for which, therefore, the Veda is the only instrument of knowledge. Mīmāṃsā authors also claim that all cognitions, qua cognitions, are in themselves valid, unless and until a subsequent cognition invalidates them. However, since the Veda cannot be invalidated by data of different origin, given that it is the only instrument of knowledge regarding dharma, it remains valid.
Consequently, Mīmāṃsā authors need to demonstrate that dharma is really unattainable by other instruments of knowledge.
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors say that the dharma cannot be known through other instruments of knowledge because it is future and sense-perception only grasps present items (see ŚV codanā 115, translated in Kataoka 2011). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā solution is that the dharma is trikālānavacchinna 'not delimited by the three times'. This means that the dharma does not belong to the usual temporality, which is the characteristic of common experience. It rather belongs to a different dimension, that of what has to be done, which cannot be seized by the usual instruments of knowledge, which only grasp what is present, or grasped what was present and is now past, or will grasp what will be present.
Did Prābhākaras 'anticipate' modal logic?
On the distinction of precincts of application, so that perception cannot seize dharma, see this post.
In synthesis, Mīmāṃsā authors argue in favour of the validity of the Veda due to the fact that it is the only instrument of knowledge through which one can know dharma. Mīmāṃsakas divide in fact what can be known into two precincts, on the one hand common experience, which encompasses what can be known through sense-perception and the other instruments of knowledge (inference, analogy and cogent evidence, to which Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors only add absence), which ultimately depend on perceptual data. On the other hand there is dharma, which cannot be known through sense-perception and for which, therefore, the Veda is the only instrument of knowledge. Mīmāṃsā authors also claim that all cognitions, qua cognitions, are in themselves valid, unless and until a subsequent cognition invalidates them. However, since the Veda cannot be invalidated by data of different origin, given that it is the only instrument of knowledge regarding dharma, it remains valid.
Consequently, Mīmāṃsā authors need to demonstrate that dharma is really unattainable by other instruments of knowledge.
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā authors say that the dharma cannot be known through other instruments of knowledge because it is future and sense-perception only grasps present items (see ŚV codanā 115, translated in Kataoka 2011). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā solution is that the dharma is trikālānavacchinna 'not delimited by the three times'. This means that the dharma does not belong to the usual temporality, which is the characteristic of common experience. It rather belongs to a different dimension, that of what has to be done, which cannot be seized by the usual instruments of knowledge, which only grasp what is present, or grasped what was present and is now past, or will grasp what will be present.
Did Prābhākaras 'anticipate' modal logic?
On the distinction of precincts of application, so that perception cannot seize dharma, see this post.
Thursday, January 5, 2012
World Sanskrit Conference — 1 (author's intention)
The 15th World Sanskrit Conference just started. Until now there have been only two parallel sections (I attended two panels: "Sanskrit and Science" and "Philosophy"). As often stated on this blog, I can't understand why many people read instead of talking. There is just no need to have further reasons to be boring.
By contrast, the present conference is made much more exciting by many interesting discussions. The paṇḍits participating to it, for instance, really had many appealing arguments to Iwasaki Yoichi's learned paper on the topic of tātpāryajñāna 'cognition of the intention'. Basically the problem under examination was that of polysemy. Nyāya authors solve it by recurring to the speaker's intention. One will know whether Rāma refers to Balarāma, Paraśurāma or Sītā's husband because the speaker meant only one of them. Now, Gaṅgeśa, while referring to Prābhākara theses, also speaks of tātpāryajñāna. How can this be, given that Prābhākaras are known to refute the tātpāryajñāna, since they claim that the Veda has no author? How could they solve the problem of polysemy in the Veda? Personally, I would say that there are many ways to solve this problem even without any author. But what does Gaṅgeśa mean by speaking of tātpāryajñāna while dealing with the Prābhākaras? The paper's author, Yoichi Iwasaki, proposed that tātpāryajñāna might have meant (pace the commentators) the text's intention. I have never read of tātpāryajñāna in the Prābhākara texts I can remember and I do not agree with the suggestion that it might have been in some lost texts. Could it mean the intention of the hearer? Given that the meaning is not arbitrary according to most Indian theories, the intention of the hearer cannot miss the meaning. It will be based, e.g., on context.
On reading in conferences, see this post. On an alternative idea of conferences, see this one and the corresponding wiki.
By contrast, the present conference is made much more exciting by many interesting discussions. The paṇḍits participating to it, for instance, really had many appealing arguments to Iwasaki Yoichi's learned paper on the topic of tātpāryajñāna 'cognition of the intention'. Basically the problem under examination was that of polysemy. Nyāya authors solve it by recurring to the speaker's intention. One will know whether Rāma refers to Balarāma, Paraśurāma or Sītā's husband because the speaker meant only one of them. Now, Gaṅgeśa, while referring to Prābhākara theses, also speaks of tātpāryajñāna. How can this be, given that Prābhākaras are known to refute the tātpāryajñāna, since they claim that the Veda has no author? How could they solve the problem of polysemy in the Veda? Personally, I would say that there are many ways to solve this problem even without any author. But what does Gaṅgeśa mean by speaking of tātpāryajñāna while dealing with the Prābhākaras? The paper's author, Yoichi Iwasaki, proposed that tātpāryajñāna might have meant (pace the commentators) the text's intention. I have never read of tātpāryajñāna in the Prābhākara texts I can remember and I do not agree with the suggestion that it might have been in some lost texts. Could it mean the intention of the hearer? Given that the meaning is not arbitrary according to most Indian theories, the intention of the hearer cannot miss the meaning. It will be based, e.g., on context.
On reading in conferences, see this post. On an alternative idea of conferences, see this one and the corresponding wiki.
Tuesday, November 29, 2011
What is the scope of recognition as an instrument of knowledge?
Is recognition (pratyabhijñā) reliable? It is part of direct perception (pratyakṣa)? Is it a distinct instrument of knowledge?
Many Indian authors use recognition as evidence in their arguments. They may say that the same thing can be touched and then seen and that we know through recognition that it is the same thing (Nyāya). Or, they might say that the fact that we recognise things through time is evidence of the fact that there is an "I" (Nyāya). Or, they claim that this "I" can recognise its nature as identical with Īśvara (Śaivas such as Utpaladeva). Recognition might also play a role within analogy (upamāna), when we recognise the gayal as being the animal about which we heard that it was similar to a cow.
Yet, Indian authors do not generally state that recognition is a distinct instrument of knowledge. Hence, to be reliable it should be included in another instrument of knowledge. The best candidate seems to be pratyakṣa, but Rāmānujācārya, for one, says that pratyakṣa is "purely born out of the sense-faculties" (saṃskārajamātra) and that "purely" is meant to exclude recognition, which, like memory (smṛti), depends also on recollection traces (saṃskāras) (TR I).
Recognition is itself different of memory, since it does not depend only on saṃskāras (so Śālikanātha, PrP).
Hence, how can recognition be reliable? Perhaps, because a part (aṃśa) of it is perceptual and hence reliable. In the standard formula of recognition, sa eva idam ("this is the one [I cognised before]''), the perceptual part is the idam ('this'). This does not seem to entail more than the sheer perception of something. However, since perception includes, according to Mīmāṃsakas and against Buddhists, also its qualifications, the idam-part may include its resemblence with the previous saḥ. Even if notion of the saḥ depends on saṃskāras, then, the sheer fact of similarity could be perceptually established.
Many Indian authors use recognition as evidence in their arguments. They may say that the same thing can be touched and then seen and that we know through recognition that it is the same thing (Nyāya). Or, they might say that the fact that we recognise things through time is evidence of the fact that there is an "I" (Nyāya). Or, they claim that this "I" can recognise its nature as identical with Īśvara (Śaivas such as Utpaladeva). Recognition might also play a role within analogy (upamāna), when we recognise the gayal as being the animal about which we heard that it was similar to a cow.
Yet, Indian authors do not generally state that recognition is a distinct instrument of knowledge. Hence, to be reliable it should be included in another instrument of knowledge. The best candidate seems to be pratyakṣa, but Rāmānujācārya, for one, says that pratyakṣa is "purely born out of the sense-faculties" (saṃskārajamātra) and that "purely" is meant to exclude recognition, which, like memory (smṛti), depends also on recollection traces (saṃskāras) (TR I).
Recognition is itself different of memory, since it does not depend only on saṃskāras (so Śālikanātha, PrP).
Hence, how can recognition be reliable? Perhaps, because a part (aṃśa) of it is perceptual and hence reliable. In the standard formula of recognition, sa eva idam ("this is the one [I cognised before]''), the perceptual part is the idam ('this'). This does not seem to entail more than the sheer perception of something. However, since perception includes, according to Mīmāṃsakas and against Buddhists, also its qualifications, the idam-part may include its resemblence with the previous saḥ. Even if notion of the saḥ depends on saṃskāras, then, the sheer fact of similarity could be perceptually established.
Friday, July 8, 2011
What happened between Śālikanātha and Rāmānujācārya?
As discussed in two previous posts (here and here) Śālikanātha Miśra (IX c.?) dedicates several pages to the ontology of the ātman. These pages appear neither innovative nor particularly original, yet Śālikanātha must have deemed the topic important enough to include it in his Prakaraṇapañcikā. By contrast, Rāmānujācārya (after the XIII c.) hardly if ever uses the term ātman and does not discuss at all any ontological argument about it. That the topic of the subject interests him is, however, proved by the many pages about its hermeneutical and epistemological phenomenology.
Why does Śālikanātha feel the need to add ontological arguments, probably borrowed from the Nyāya school? And why does not Rāmānujācārya feel the same need? What happened between the two?
The following answer is more than tentative and it is based mostly on the method of investigating into the history of ideas (Ideengeschichte). It is easy to see that one of Śālikanātha's principal opponents, namely the Buddhist Pramāṇavādin, is altogether absent in Rāmānujācārya's work. In fact, Rāmānujācārya was active in South India and at a time (after the XIII c.) when Buddhism was no longer a philosophical concurrent. Consequently, Śālikanātha might have felt the need to defend the ātman also from an ontological point of view, in order to resist to the Buddhist anātmavāda, whereas Rāmānujācārya was active at a time in which the existence of an ātman was common sense among philosophers. Consequently, he could rather focus on its epistemological and hermeneutic phenomenology.
Vincent Eltschinger has attempted (in his book Penser l'Autorité des Ecritures) a similar solution of the different approaches to the Buddha's word in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Do you deem it legitimate to use extra-philosophical arguments to interpret a philosopher's thought?
On Śālikanātha on the ātman, see here and here. I dedicated several posts to V. Eltschinger's book. See for instance, here (first post on the book), here (discussing why we need Sacred Texts) and here (discussing an expert's different fields of expertise).
Thursday, July 7, 2011
Ontology and phenomenology of the ātman
A bright colleague of mine (Daniele Cuneo) pointed out that Śālikanātha's passage in yesterday's post might as well be interpreted as purely ontological. The point could be that the subject is fix and that it only seems manyfold in its epistemological role.
In fact, the emphasis on the subject as knower might be interpreted as just instrumental to the ontological foundation of the ātman. That this is not the case is at least suggested by the history of the Mīmāṃsā reflection on this subject, which originates from Vedic hermeneutic concerns and not from ontological ones. Historically, it is more probably the case that ontological arguments have been added in order to firmly ground the subject's phenomenological role in epistemology and ritual hermeneutics.
How comes, then, that the ontological approach is added to the phenomenological one? Hypothetically, one might propose that Śālikanātha adds to the standard Prābhākara argumentation, based on the Veda and, therefore, on the phenomenology of the subject and on its role in epistemology, a further line of argumentation, based on ontology and inspired by the arguments of its opposers, mainly Naiyāyika authors. Consider the following sequence of arguments (with no interruption in between) and note the shift to the usage of ātman in the ontological section:
In fact, the emphasis on the subject as knower might be interpreted as just instrumental to the ontological foundation of the ātman. That this is not the case is at least suggested by the history of the Mīmāṃsā reflection on this subject, which originates from Vedic hermeneutic concerns and not from ontological ones. Historically, it is more probably the case that ontological arguments have been added in order to firmly ground the subject's phenomenological role in epistemology and ritual hermeneutics.
How comes, then, that the ontological approach is added to the phenomenological one? Hypothetically, one might propose that Śālikanātha adds to the standard Prābhākara argumentation, based on the Veda and, therefore, on the phenomenology of the subject and on its role in epistemology, a further line of argumentation, based on ontology and inspired by the arguments of its opposers, mainly Naiyāyika authors. Consider the following sequence of arguments (with no interruption in between) and note the shift to the usage of ātman in the ontological section:
(Vedic-based argument:) In regard to someone who [performs] no action, agency and experience would be [merely] hypothetical. [But] an agent and an experiencer, presupposed by the [Vedic] sentence about the one having the sacrifice's weapons [which refers to the ātman as the sacrificer and as the one who will enjoy heavenly bliss],1 must be determined, hence the mention of recognition has been put forth.
(Nyāya-influenced argument:) And when this self has been recognised, then the self [endowed with] consciousness is its characteristic. Nor does it arise at a certain point from it (self) alone. For an effect whose [single] cause is always proximate would not arise [only] from time to time. […] Therefore this self, which is the inherent cause [of consciousness], requires a [further] cause, one that is inherent to it.2
1 “This sacrificer who has the sacrifice's weapons (the sacrifice's substances and tools), will go to the heavenly world quickly” (sa eṣa yajñāyudhī yajamāno 'ñjasā svargaṃ lokaṃ yāti). The sentence is discussed by Śabara, ŚBh ad MS 1.1.5. I could not locate a Vedic source for it.
2 According to the Nyāya school, there are three sorts of causes: 1. the samavāyikāraṇa 'inherent cause', such as the two halves of a pot, which inhere in the effect (the pot); 2. the asamavāyikāraṇa 'cause which does not inhere [in the effect, but rather inheres in the inherent cause], such as the colour of the two halves, which inheres in them, but not directly in the pot; 3. the nimittakāraṇa 'necessary condition', such as the potter.
Why does Śālikanātha feel the need to add ontological arguments? (My tentative answer will follow shortly, but I would be glad to read your opinion about it).
On more insights about the subject (this time in the Mānavadharmaśāstra) by Daniele Cuneo, see here.
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Ontological or epistemological arguments for the subject?
Rāmānujācārya definitely favours a non-ontological approach to the problem of the subject. For him, the subject is what one becomes due to hearing and obeying to Vedic prescriptions.
What about his more systematic predecessor, Śālikanātha?
How can the two approaches coexist?
On Rāmānujācārya's approach, see here. For further post on the topic of subjectivity, check the label "subject".
What about his more systematic predecessor, Śālikanātha?
Since its very beginning, the chapter he dedicates to this topic (the Tattvāloka within his Prakaraṇapañcikā) seems to look for a balance between the two opposite tendencies. In its second verse, the first two padas are rather ontologically oriented, whereas the last two stress the role of the subject as the agent of cognitions we can experience in every day life:
The self, distinguished from intellect, sense faculties and from the body, is an all-pervasive substance |
different according to each field (of experience) [i.e., according to each empirical individual] , it shines forth in the act of understanding of the objects ||
(buddhīndriyaśarīrebhyo bhinna ātmā vibhur dhruvaḥ | nānābhūtaḥ pratikṣetram arthavittiṣu bhāsate || 2 ||)
Moreover, the subject is repeatedly identified as the knower (jñātṛ) and its necessity is demonstrated through epistemological arguments (such as the need for a reunification of different sense-cognitions and the possibility of memory).
How can the two approaches coexist?
On Rāmānujācārya's approach, see here. For further post on the topic of subjectivity, check the label "subject".
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
Where is the subject during errors?
The Prābhākara view distinguishes three elements within a cognition: the act of cognition, the object cognised and its cogniser. It also claims that they are inseparably known through every single cognitive act, insofar as no cognition of an object is possible without a cognising subject and without a cognitive act itself. Nor is one only aware of the sheer cognised object, without any frame. One knows a known object. This also means that, in the Prābhākara view, a cognition is a piece of knowledge only insofar as it is self-aware. It is not, as in Sāṅkhya and Nyāya, a mechanical act to which the conscious subject adds awareness. In order to be a knowledge, it must be intrinsically conscious.
What about acts of cognition which are not self-aware? A cognitive act which were not self-aware could not be a case of knowledge, because it would necessarily lack the important component of presentness. But are such cases conceptually possible? An interesting example is discussed by Rāmānujācārya in the epistemological chapter of TR (TR I). Rāmānujācārya mentions the case of the memory of silver which arises in one's mind while seeing a piece of mother-of-pearl on the beach. One sees mother-of-pearl and automatically remembers silver. This is said to be only an incomplete cognition and cannot be a piece of knowledge. Now, one could ask, who is the agent in the case of such cognitions? And how comes that s/he seems not to be included in such cognitive acts, since s/he is said to be necessarily included in acts of knowledge? Do they just arise due to saṃskāras and, hence, automatically or is a knower nonetheless present?
In fact, in the case of a conscious recollection of silver, one would simultaneously be aware of oneself and of the act of recollection. By contrast, the recollection of silver evoked by a lustrous piece of mother-of-pearl seems to be necessarily unconscious, since if it were conscious, one would be able to distinguish it as a separate piece of cognition and one would not conflate the remembered silver with the apprehended lustrous thing. Does not its “incompleteness” exactly refer to the fact that it lacks the element of a knower and of an act of cognition?
If this interpretation is correct, such cognitions would arise independently of a subject, which would else necessarily be included in the knowledge act. They arise due to saṃskāras and are, hence, not acts of knowledge performed by an agent, but only results of the saṃskāras' function. Hence, they can occur independently of an agent.
Do readers have a different understanding of the way saṃskāras function? And of the Nyāya or Sāṅkhya epistemologies?
On mother-of-pearl mistaken as silver, see also this post.
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