Paper manuscripts in South Asia

Birgit Kellner asks on the Indology list which are the oldest dated paper manuscripts in India and Nepal, mentioning for India a mns dated 1198 and for Nepal a mns dated 1105. Why did paper manuscripts remain comparatively rare until recent times, then? Was paper too expensive? Were trade-routes from China and Tibet not commonly used? After all, paper was well spread in China and Tibet since much older time.

Later Mīmāṃsakas on arthabhāvanā

I have already mentioned Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara's interpretation of artha in arthabhāvanā as “puruṣa”. It is such a surprising interpretation, that I would like to know how he came to that. I never read it in any other author and Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara does not explain in detail why it has to be like that. He rather presents it as if it were self-evident, a hint to the fact that it was an interpretation well-spread in his milieu? Or does the cursory reference refer to the minor importance of the etymological interpretation? In fact, other Mīmāṃsakas just do not bother in etymologically explain the meaning of arthabhāvanā (unlike they do with śabdabhāvanā). So Rāmānujācārya and Āpadeva, the author of Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa. In his excellent translation of this work, Franklyn Edgerton uses “end-efficient-force” for arthabhāvanā, but he does not explain how he came to that translation.

Another possible symmetry between śabdabhāvanā and arthabhāvanā

Kei Kataoka maintains that śabdabhāvanā and arthabhāvanā ought to be symmetrical. Hence, śabde bhāvanā=śabdabhāvanā. arthe bhāvanā=arthabhāvanā. Artha ity ukte kim? puruṣaḥ.
But I am not fully satisfied by this understanding of artha. Moreover, arthātmikā bhāvanā is hardly understandable as puruṣātmikā bhāvanā. On the other hand, the proposal that Kumārila just devised two symmetrical names not thinking of any symmetry between the two is also unsatisfying, especially in so far as Kumārila painstakingly tried to develop two parallel theories for the two bhāvanās, although he had obvious problems with the karaṇa and the bhāvya (which is not at all desirable) of the śabdabhāvanā. See, e.g. Rāmānujācārya's refutation in Tantrarahasya, IV, §3.7.2. 

So, what about the next proposal:
śabdabhāvanā= bhāvanā ca śabdaś ca, sā (karmadhāraya)
arthabhāvanā=bhāvanā ca artha ca, sā (karmadhāraya).
Artha ity ukte “prayojanaṃ, śabdārthaṃ ca”. Kasya arthaḥ? śabdabhāvanāyāḥ. śabdabhāvanāyāḥ arthaḥ puruṣavyāpāraḥ iti arthabhāvanā puruṣavyāpārabhāvanā iti yāvat. ata eva kumārilabhaṭṭena “arthātmikā bhāvanā” iti, “śabdātmikā bhāvanā” iti ca uktam. ācāryaḥ “arthātmikā” iti uccaraṇasamaye “puruṣavyāpārātmikā” iti manyate. “puruṣavyāpārātmikā” ca pārthasārathimiśrasya pustake, rāmānujācāryasyāpi punaḥ punar viditam.

A border line problem between philology and philosophy? What did Kumārila mean with “bhāvanā”?

A short terminological excursus: bhāvanā is a rather common name throughout Sanskrit philosophy (it designates, e.g., a peculiar meditation in Buddhism and in Kashmir Śivaism, a linguistic function in Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka's aesthetical theory, etc.). It is found in grammar.

Within Mīmāṃsā, it is found already in Śabara (see, e.g., his commentary ad MS 2.1.1) as indicating the activity of a person, designated by the verbal forms and directed to an object. In fact, such an activity is further specified by its requiring an object, an instrument and a procedure (respectively answering the question “what [does one do]?”, “through what?” and “how?”). In accordance to such an interpretation, Śabara paraphrases svargakāmo yajeta as yāgena svargaṃ bhavati. That is, an object/aim (according to the polysemy of the Sanskrit term artha, noticeably within Mīmāṃsā, see MS 1.1.5 et passim) is connected to the bhāvanā, the root of the verb is read as an instrument (yāgena), and the verbal action is designated by the conjugated verbal form alone (bhavati). Later on, Kumārila noticed that such an account does not make sense of the prescriptive character of, say, yajeta as opposed to yajati. Therefore, he introduced a further bhāvanā, called śabdabhāvanā. This one is peculiar to prescriptive forms (that is, liṅ, loṭ, leṭ, tavya, but also present indicative forms may do, if the semantic of the passage requires a prescriptive meaning) and it accounts for their faculty to make whoever listens to them feel compelled to perform the action indicated by the verbal root. It has still nothing to do with the actual performance of such action, it operates purely on a linguistic niveau and therefore Kumārila has named it “linguistic bhāvanā”. At that point, he had to qualify also the other bhāvanā, the one meant by Śabara. In opposition to śabdabhāvanā (or śābdībhāvanā), he called it arthabhāvanā (or ārthībhāvanā), that is “actual bhāvanā”, “objective bhāvanā”, or “purpose[-oriented] bhāvanā”. So, this latter designation is less precise than the first one and is mainly devised in opposition to the former. In fact, “bhāvanā” alone is commonly used to indicate the ārthībhāvanā.

More in detail, the PP in §3.16 seem to reinterpret ārthībhāvanā as puruṣārthabhāvanā, so “bhāvanā having a human end [as its bhāvya]”, “purpose-[oriented] bhāvanā”. But is this a reinterpretation or the initial meaning of arthabhāvanā? It would rather seem an innovation of R., who drives from a parallel VN passage, but emphasises the etymological understanding of arthabhāvanā (whereas the VN passage speaks of arthabhāvanā as puruṣārthasādhana). In fact, the innovation of Kumārila, who distinguished between śabda- and arthabhāvanā seems to presupose the opposition between śabda (as language) and artha (as its object). Nonetheless, I could not find a precise explanation of arthabhāvanā as meaning “the efficient force directed on an external object” or the like. Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa, a late Bhāṭṭa primer, explains: arthayata ity arthaḥ phalakāmaḥ puruṣaḥ (MBP, II adhyāya; 74.15-16, quoted in Kataoka 2004:167, fn. 190), and Kei Kataoka also suggests (personal communication, 1 October 2008) that “Kumārila probably has in mind puruṣa as artha”. This means that when Rāmānujācārya explains arthabhāvanā as puruṣaprayatnas, tatpravṛttir (§3), bhāvanā is tantamount to prayatna or pravṛtti and arthabhāvanā means arthasya, puruṣasya, prayatna. The equation artha-puruṣa can be justified as follows:
1. MBP's statement, and Bhatta Śaṅkara's explanation that, when interpreting artha as person, the meaning “person” should be derived from the understanding of artha from the root arth-, X class, “to desire” (hence, “a person who desires” is an artha, since “a” is, among other meanings, a kṛt suffix indicating the agent, according to the list in Ā III and to Kāśikā on Ā III 4.67) and not from the root arth-, IV class, “to be an object” (arthyate). By the way, the latter seems to be an artificially conceived root, not attested in the Amarakośa, nor in the Śabdakalpadruma, nor in the Dhātupāṭha, nor in modern dictionaries such as PW and Monier William's.
2. The symmetry between śabdabhāvanā and arthabhāvanā. It is in fact hardly the case that Kumārila devised the two names without linking them to each other. Pārthasārathi Miśra proposes two interpretations of the compound śabdabhāvanā, as a karmadhāraya and as a tatpuruṣa respectively. If it is a karmadhāraya, however, it is hard to conceive a symmetric understanding of arthabhāvanā, which should mean “that efficient force which consists in an object/a purpose”. On the other hans, if śabdabhāvanā is tantamount to “an efficient force (bhāvanā) which has a statement as its locus of action” (as with Pārthasārathi Miśra's explanation of śabdabhāvanā as a tatpuruṣa, see below), arthabhāvanā would mean “an efficient force which has an artha as its locus of action”. Artha in this connection cannot be the final object brought about by the activity, but only the locus where this activity finds place, that is, a person.
3. The fact that arthabhāvanā and śabdabhāvanā are also called by Kumārila arthātmikā bhāvanā and śabdātmikā bhāvanā and those explanations need to be made sense of in a symmetric way.

On the other hand, the understanding of śabdabhāvanā is made easier by Pārthasārathimiśra's etymological explanation, see Kataoka 2004: 167-8, fn. 190: “ahidhāyāḩ śabdasya bhāvanā abhidhābhāvanā (NRM VN, 77.1) and “abhidhīyata iti abhidhā pravartanā”. Hence, śabdabhāvanā could be explained as a karmadhāraya or as a tatpuruṣa.

Sanskrit usages 2:artha

The Pūrvapakṣin in Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya, chapter IV, §3.16, seems to reinterpret ārthībhāvanā as puruṣārthabhāvanā, so “bhāvanā having a human end [as its bhāvya]”, “purpose-[oriented] bhāvanā”. But is this a reinterpretation or the initial meaning of arthabhāvanā? It would indeed seem an innovation of R., who drives from a parallel Vidhinirṇaya (Pārthasārathimiśra's) passage, but emphasises the etymological understanding of arthabhāvanā (whereas the VN passage speaks of arthabhāvanā as puruṣārthasādhana). In fact, the innovation of Kumārila, who distinguished between śabda- and arthabhāvanā seems to presupose the opposition between śabda (as language) and artha (as its object). Nonetheless, I could not find a precise explanation of arthabhāvanā as meaning “the efficient force directed on an external object” or the like. Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa, a late Bhāṭṭa primer, explains: arthayata ity arthaḥ phalakāmaḥ puruṣaḥ (MBP, II adhyāya; 74.15-16, quoted in Kataoka 2004:167, fn. 190), and Kei Kataoka also suggests (personal communication, 1 October 2008) that “Kumārila probably has in mind puruṣa as artha”. Does this mean that the object of the arthabhāvanā is a person's [activity]? Should, hence, arthabhāvanā be interpreted as artham bhāvayati –arthaś ca puruṣavyāparaḥ iti bhāvaḥ? Or rather, bhāvanā means vyāpāra and arthabhāvanā means arthasya, puruṣasya, vyāpāraḥ (with the puruṣasya as the agent)? This latter solution goes, I fear, too far. But how else could puruṣa be the artha?

Sanskrit usages: ācārya

Rāmāṇujācārya is a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka who has also commented in a Bhāṭṭa garb a Bhāṭṭa work, Pārthasārathimiśra's Nyāyaratnamālā. In Rāmānujācārya's works, Kumārila is constantly referred to as “ācārya” (see TR IV, §3, §3.17, §9.4.1, NR ad AN, III, 28, p. 253). And also Pārthasārathi Miśra uses the same appellation (1937: 75).
Is “ācārya” a self-understood way to refer to Kumārila? Is it common in Buddhist sources, too? Elsewehere, ācārya seems to be used in order to refer to a teacher of a rival school (against guru). So possibly in Madhyamaka literature, see D.S. Ruegg 1981: 58, fn. 171 (where svayūthya is opposed to ācārya).
By the way, R. does not call himself “ācārya”, this appellation is used among Sanskritists chiefly in order to distinguish him from the best known Śrī Rāmāṇuja.

Curriculum Vitae

Elisa Freschi

Education:
–Italian 5 years degree (approximately BA+MA) in Sanskrit under the tuition of Prof. Raffaele Torella and Prof. Raniero Gnoli (University “La Sapienza” faculty of Oriental Studies, Rome, Italy). During those 5 years I spent a semester in India and a semester in Vienna, where I studied in the Universität Wien under the tuition of Prof. Ernst Steinkellner and Prof. Chlodwig Werba.
–BA in Western Philosophy under the tuition of Prof. Mirella Capozzi and Prof. Marco Maria Olivetti (University “La Sapienza”, faculty of Philosophy, Rome, Italy).
–Three years degree in Tibetan Language and Civilization by the IsIAO (former called IsMEO).
–PhD in Society, Culture and Economics of the Indian Subcontinent (University “La Sapienza”, faculties of Oriental Studies, of Economics, and of Humanities, Rome, Italy).
–Advanced course in Spoken Sanskrit, organized by the university of Heildeberg and held by Dr. Sadananda Das (Firenze, 7-29 settembre 2004).

European languages known: German (KDS), English (Proficiency), French (8 years study), Italian (mother tongue), Russian (4 semesters), Latin (10 years study), Ancient Greek (8 years study).
Asian languages known: Sanskrit (also Spoken Sanskrit), Classical Tibetan, Modern Tibetan, Hindi, Bengali (2 semesters), Mongolian (1 semester).


Research areas:
–Linguistic and Epistemology of the Mīmāṃsā school, especially as regards the Sacred Texts as instrument of knowledge.
–Comparative Philosophy especially in the fields of linguistics, epistemology and deontic logic.
–Philological examination of the manuscripts of the Tibetan canon hold in the IsIAO Library.
–Study of the siddha culture both in its Indian (Sanskrit and Apabhraṃśa) and its Tibetan aspect.

Publications:
–Thesis (Italian 5 Years Degree) La Mokṣakārikā di Sadyojyotis con il commento di Rāmakaṇṭha, University “La Sapienza” Rome 2001.
–BA Thesis Testimonianza e Certezza nella Logique di Port Royal, University “La Sapienza” Rome 2002.
–PhD Thesis Validity of Sacred Texts in Mīmāṃsā Tradition, University “La Sapienza” Rome 2006.

–Entries Dhammapada, Dhvanyāloka, Jātakamālā, Lokānanda, Sāṃkhyakārikā, Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra, Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra, Yogasūtra, in Dizionario Bompiani delle opere e dei personaggi di tutti i tempi e di tutte le letterature Bompiani, Milano 2005.
–Entries Agus Salim, Akhilānanda Svāmin, Aurobindo Gosh, N.V. Banerjee, K.C. Bhattacharya, Sibajiban Bhattacharya, Ā. Coomaraswamy, Daya Krishna, M. Hiriyana, J. Krishnamurti, T.M.P. Mahadevan, B.K. Matilal, J.L. Mehta, S. Radhakrishnan in Enciclopedia Filosofica, Centro Studi Filosofici di Gallarate, Roma 2006.
–Entries Abhidharma, Abhinavagupta, Advaita, ahiṃsā, anumāna, artha, ātman, Aurobindo Ghose, avatāra, Bhagavadgītā, bhakti, Bhartṛhari, Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, Sibajiban Bhattacharya, brahman, Brahmasūtra, Buddhismo, causalità, dottrine indiane della, darśana, Surendranath Dasgupta, Daya Krishna, dharma, Dharmakīrti, Giainismo, guṇa, Mysore Hiriyanna, jñāna, Kabīr, karma, Jiddu Krishnamurti, Ananda K. Kumarasvami, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, lakṣaṇā, loka in Enciclopedia Filosofica Treccani, I volume, Treccani, Roma 2008.

–Entries Madhava, Madhva, Madhyamaka, T.M.P. Mahadevan, Mahāyāna, Materialismo Indiano, B.K. Matilal, māyā, J.L. Mehta, Mīmāṃsā, J.N. Mohanty, mokṣa, Nāgārjuna, Nimbarka, nirvāṇa, padārtha, R.Panikkar, Patañjali, Prabhākara Miśra, prakṛti, Pramāṇavāda, puruṣa, Radhakrishnan, Rāmānuja, Ratnakīrti, śabda, Śaivasiddhānta, saṃsāra, Śaṅkara, Sāṅkhya, A. Sen, śūnyatā, sūtra, tantrismo, Theravāda, filosofia tibetana, upamāna, Upaniṣad, Utpaladeva, Vācaspati Miśra, Vasubandhu, Veda, Vedānta, Vedānta Deśika, vikalpa, Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, Yājñavalkya, Yoga, Yogācāra in Enciclopedia Filosofica Treccani, II volume, Treccani, Roma 2009.

–(with A. Graheli) Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā and Nyāya on Veda and Tradition, in F. Squarcini (ed.) Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction of Traditions in South Asia, Munshiram Manoharlal and FUP NEw Delhi-Firenze 2005.
–Kumārila’s Defence of Realism, in «Rivista di Studi Sudasiatici» 1 (2006, full free pdf here).
–Qual è la realtà di un'illusione? La risposta di Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, in «SLiFO» (2008, forthcoming).
–Mīmāṃsā, in Purushottama Bilimoria (ed.), Routledge History of Indian Philosophy, (forthcoming).
–Unveiling (Indian) Philosophy, in «Rivista di Studi Sudasiatici» 2 (2007, full free pdf here).

–Desidero Ergo Sum: The Subject as the Desirous One in Mīmāṃsā, in «Rivista di Studi Orientali», 80 (2007) (pre-print version available here –scroll down until you find it).
–Abhāvapramāṇa and error in Kumārila's commentators, in «Saṃbhāṣā. Nagoya Studies», 27.3 (2008).

–Structuring the Chaos: Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā Hermeneutics as Depicted in Rāmānujācārya's Śāstraprameyapariccheda. Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Fourth Section, in «East and West» 58, 1-4 (2008), pp.157-184 (pdf available here).

–How do exhortative expressions work? Bhāvanā and vidhi in Rāmānujācārya and other Mīmāṃsā authors, in «Rivista di Studi Orientali» 81 (2008): 149-185.

–Review of Alex Watson's The Self's Awareness of Itself, in «Philosophy East and West» 59.3 (luglio 2009), (pre-print version available here).

–Facing the boundaries of epistemology: Kumārila on error and negative cognition, in «Journal of Indian Philosophy» 38.1 (2010), pp.39-48 (pdf available here).

–Indian Philosophers, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Costantine Sandis and Timothy O'Connor, Wiley-Blackwell (2010) (see a review here).
–Review of Ellison Banks Findly's Plant Lives: Borderline Beings in Indian Traditions, in «Philosophy East and West», 61.2 (2011), pp.380-5 (pdf available here).
—''General Introduction'', in Elisa Freschi, Artemij Keidan, Matilde Adduci, Cristina Bignami, Daniele Cuneo, Camillo Formigatti and Elena Mucciarelli (eds.) Proceedings of the first Coffee Break Conference: The Study of Asia between Antiquity and Modernity, Rivista di Studi Orientali 84 (2011).

–Did Mimamsa authors formulate a theory of action?, in Nina Mirnig, Michael Williams, Peter-Dániel Szántó (eds.), Puṣpikā: Tracing Ancient India Through Texts and Traditions. Contributions to Current Research in Indology. Volume I, Oxbow Books Press (forthcoming).
–Proposals for the study of quotations in Indian Philosophical texts, in «Religions of South Asia» (forthcoming).
–Does the subject have desires? The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā answer. In: Puṣpikā 2. Proceedings of IIGRS, held at the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 23-24 september 2010.
–Action, Desire and Subjectivity in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. In: Chakravarthi, Ram-Prasad and Jonardon Ganeri (eds.), Self: Hindu Responses to Buddhist Critiques (forthcoming).
—Review of James A. Benson's Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṅgraha, in «Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens», september 2011 (forthcoming).
—(with Tiziana Pontillo) ''When one thing applies more than once: tantra and prasaṅga in Śrautasūtra, Mīmāṃsā and Grammar'', in Tiziana Pontillo and Maria Piera Candotti (eds.), Signless Signification. Ancient India and Greece Reflections on Denotation in absentia, Anthem, London (forthcoming).
—"Mīmāṃsā", in Purushottama Bilimoria, Richard Kind and Guy Petterson (eds.), The History of Indian Philosophy, Routledge (forthcoming).
—''Review of James Benson's translation and edition of Mahādeva Vedāntin's Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṅgraha'', in Acta Orientalia (Societates Orientales Danica, Fennica, Norvegica, Svecica) (forthcoming).




Lectures:
–Introduzione alla Mīmāṃsā, Università “Sapienza”, Roma, aprile 2004.
Presentazione del libro curato da F. Squarcini “Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction of Traditions in South Asia” (Munshiram Manoharlal and FUP NEw Delhi-Firenze 2005), Università “Sapienza̦”, Roma, maggio 2007.
–È possibile un trattamento realista di errore e assenza? La risposta di Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, XIII Convegno dell'Associazione Italiana Studi Sanscriti, Roma, 25-26 gennaio 2007.
–La Natura nella filosofia indiana, (10 lectures), Università Statale degli Studi di Milano, ottobre 2008.
–La Parola nella Filosofia Indiana, Udine, 26 novembre 2008.

–Soggetto e oggetto si incontrano: la filosofia dell'azione nella Mimamsa. XIV Convegno dell'Associazione Italiana Studi Sanscriti, Napoli, 25 settembre 2009.

–Did Mimamsa authors formulate a theory of action?, IIGRS (see http://iigrs.byethost17.com/programme/), Oxford, september 2009.

–Il cammino del desiderio (kāmamārga) nella filosofia indiana, Università Statale degli Studi di Milano, 17 novembre 2009.
–Does the subject have desires? The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā answer, IIGRS 2, Cambridge, 23-24 september 2010.
–Quando una sola prescrizione continua a valere anche in absentia: prospettive dalla ritualistica, Il segno e il vuoto, Cagliari 8-9 aprile 2011.
—The Study of Indian Linguistics. Prescriptive Function of Language in the Nyāyamañjarī
and in the Speech Act Theory, Moscow University for the Humanities, Open pages in South Asian Studies, 27-28 april 2011.
—Filosofia ed epistemologia nell’India Classica, Collegio di Milano, 3 novembre 2011.
—(with Artemij Keidan), What is the goal one has in view while editing a philosophical work?, 15th World Sanskrit Conference, New Delhi 5-10 January 2012.

Academic positions and Scholarships awarded in South Asian sphere:
–Erasmus scholarship (march the 1st 1999-july the 31st 1999).
–Full scholarship during the PhD (november the 1st 2002-october the 31st 2005).
–Renewable grant awarded by the University of Milan for training activities in a foreign country (november the 1st 2007-october the 31st 2008).
-Grant awarded by the University of Milan for training activities in a foreign country (november the 1st 2008-october the 31st 2009).

–Research Fellow of Sanskrit at the University "Sapienza", Rome (january the 1st 2009-to present).
—Michael Coulson Fellowship, Wolfson College, Oxford, febrary-april 2011.
—Japanese Society for the Promotion of Sciences Fellowship, University of Kyushu, March 2012.
—Austrian Academy of Sciences, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia, Lise Meitner Project funded by the FWF, September 2012–October 2014.

Teaching experiences in South Asian studies:
–teaching and tuition of Sanskrit Language (first to fourth semester) at university “La Sapienza”, Rome (october 2002-october 2004).
–teaching of easy Sanskrit texts to students up from 4th semester (noticeably Bhagavadgītā, text along with Śrīdhara’s commentary) (march 2004-july 2004).
–lecturing of Indian Philosophies and Religions at university “La Sapienza”, Rome (march 2007-july 2007).

Teaching experiences in Philosophy (non Indian):
—teaching and tuition on Immanuel Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2012–2013)
—teaching and tuition on B. Russell's The problems of philosophy (2012–2013)

Editorial and working experiences related to South Asian Studies:
–librarian at the Oriental Studies Library of “La Sapienza” University, Rome (october 1999-october 2001).
–translation (from German into Italian) of Wilhelm Halbfass’ Dharma, ānvīkṣikī, Philosophie, published in F. Squarcini (ed.), Verso l’India. Oltre l’India, Mimesis Milano 2003
–editing of Sanskrit and Hindi in F. Squarcini (ed.), Verso l’India. Oltre l’India, Mimesis Milano 2003.
–editing of journals related to South Asian studies (“Religioni e Società”, “Viniyoga in Italia”, “Rivista di Studi Sudasiatici”).
–editing of Indian and Tibetan languages, index of names and works for Storia della Scienza, 2. Cina, India, Americhe, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana Roma 2001.


e-mail: elisa.freschi@oeaw.ac.at
http://oeaw.academia.edu/elisafreschi