Arthabhāvanā as puruṣabhāvanā in Someśvara Bhaṭṭa

icchārthāt arthayater ṇijantād arthayata iti kartṛvivakṣāyāṃ “erac” (Āṣṭādhyāyī 3.3.53: ikārāntāt dhātoḥ ac pratyayaḥ syāt) iti ac-pratyayotpādanena arthinaḥ puruṣasya arthaśabdenābhidhānāt, bhāvanāyāś ca puruṣadharmatvāt, dharmadharmiṇoś ca atyantabhedābhāvāt tādātmyaṃ vivakṣitvā arthātmā cāsau bhāvanā ca iti vigrahaḥ kāryaḥ (Someśvara's Nyāyasudhā p. 560).

So, according to Someśvara (which is much closer to Kumārila than Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara and hence possibly more reliable), “artha” means “puruṣa”. Arthabhāvanā is interpreted by him as a karmadhāraya, since a characteristic (such as the person's initiation of the activity) and the characteristic-substratum (the person herself) are not ultimately different and can, hence, be expressed with such a composite.

Arthabhāvanā in Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi

In Kevalānandasaraswatī's (sic) impressing Mīmāṃsākoṣa the following explanation can be found:

arthabhāvanā … arthātmatvaṃ arthaviṣayatvaṃ arthāśritatvaṃ vā. tathā ca arthaniṣṭhatvād arthabhāvanā phalotpattyanukūlakṛtinodanādivyāpārarūpā ākhyātatvāvacchinnaśakyā cetanācetanakartṛsādharaṇī kartṛśaktiḥ (gāgābhaṭṭa's bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi p. 90-91). 

that is (I am not translating artha, since its meaning in this connection is exactly what I am trying to understand):

arthabhāvanā [is] the fact of having an artha as its essence, as its content or as its support. In this way, since it rests on an artha, the arthabhāvanā is the potentiality of a doer, which is common to conscious and non conscious doers, liable to be determined by verbal endings [but why -tva?], having the form of an activity such as impelling and being and action favorable to the arousal of the result.

Which does not solve the problem of its name. Then, the author of the Koṣa quotes many other authorities (Kumārila, Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara, Somanātha's commentary “Mayūkhamālikā” ad Pārthasārathi Miśra's Śāstradīpikā). Most of them do not talk at all about the etymological meaning of artha in arthabhāvanā. The longest discussions on arthabhāvanā in general are to be found, according to the Koṣa, in Gāgābhaṭṭa's Mīmāṃsācintāmaṇi and in Someśvara Bhaṭṭa's Nyȳasudhā (commentary ad TV). The latter also contains an explanation supporting Prof. Kataoka's analysis (see next posts).

śabdabhāvanā

I just found an interesting paper of Prof. Kunio Harikai, (Abhidhābhāvanā, in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 36 (18.2), pp.605-606), describing how abhidhābhāvanā has been interpreted as a tatpuruṣa or as a karmadhāraya by the Bhāṭṭa tradition, that is as 

abhidhīyate 'nena iti abhidhā

or as

abhidhīyate yā sā abhidhā

The first interpretation is to be found in Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha:

abhidhābhāvanā ity atra abhidhāśabdena “abhidhīyate anena” iti vyutpattyā śabda ucyate.

Many other Mīmāṃsakas are mentioned (Pārthasārathi Miśra, Someśvara Bhaṭṭa, Umeśa Miśra, Āpadeva). I hope I will find someone who translates for me the exact references, so that I can discuss them.

Kumārila's obscurity and Vācaspati on it

Why did Kumārila choose not to explain what he meant with “artha” in arthabhāvanā or which kind of compound is śabdabhāvanā? And why did he offer two explanations which are even more obscure, such as arthātmikā bhāvanā and śabdātmikā bhāvanā? The couple has been repeated in mantrādhikaraṇa and bhavārthādhikaraṇa (at least), hence it is not a badly deviced hapax legomenon.

In a passage pointed out by Harikai (1990:209), Vācaspatimiśra comments Maṇḍana's proposal of better discriminating (pravivic-) the prescription and rhetorically asks what is left to discriminate after Kumārila's and his followers' analyses. His answer is:

kṛto 'pi tair viveko 'kṛakalpa eva | “abhidhābhāvanām āhur” ityādisaṅkīrṇaśabdaprayogāt

(Nyāyakaṇikā ad Maṇḍana Miśra's Vidhiviveka, 1907 Banares p. 4, l. 17)

“Although they have done the discrimination, it is almost undone, because of the usage of confused expressions such as “[optative and other endings] express the designation-bhāvanā …”

Obviously enough, Vācaspati is not entirely reliable, since he wants to interpret Kumārila as maintaining the same view proposed by Maṇḍana (according to which the prescription conveys the idea that the action it enjoins is the means to accomplish something desired).

Prof. Kunio Harikai on bhāvanā

Hisataka Ishida, a young and learned scholar of Pramāṇavāda and Mīmāṃsā, kindly accepted to translate for me some pages of Harikai's translation of Kumārila's Tantravārttika, mantrādhikaraṇa. This is what I understood:

–Harikai translated bhāvanā with sokushinryoku, something like “motivating energy”. If I am not wrong, this means that Harikai understands (just like Kṛṣṇa Yajvan, see a previous post) prayojakavyāpāra to refer to “bhāvanā” alone (and not to arthabhāvanā or śabdabhāvanā, with artha and śabda featuring as the prayojakas).

–Harikai translates śabdātmika and arthātmika (adj. of bhāvanā) as “having language as its essence (honshō)” and “having a purpose (mokuteki) as its essence (honshō)”, respectively. In a footnote (fn. 99, p.208), he explains that those translations have been inspired by the bhavārthādhikaraṇa.

–Furthermore, Harikai refers to a definition of Kumārila:

tatrārthātmikāyāṃ bhāvanāyāṃ liṅādiśabdānāṃ yaḥ puruṣaṃ prati prayojakavyāpāraḥ sā dvitiyā śabdadharmo 'bhidhātmikā bhāvanā vidhir ity ucyate

Which brings me again to the problem of the exact understanding of the reference of prayojakavyāpāra (śabda-bhāvanā or just bhāvanā?). Moreover, how to understand śabdadharma? If the śabdabhāvanā “is a characteristic of language”, does this modify our understanding of the compound śabdabhāvanā? I guess that śabdadharma suits good a karmadhāraya interpretation, but does not crash against a tritiyātatpuruṣa (śabdena bhāvanā), too. I will come back to this topic.

"purpose creating bhāvanā"

Further, indirect evidences of bhāvanā being preceded in a compound by the object it produces are apūrvabhāvanā and phalabhāvanā, both common in Prābhākara texts, such as Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya or Śalikanātha Miśra's Prakaraṇapañcikā.

Sanskrit usages: vibhu vs. vyāpaka

Alessandro Graheli suggests me the following distinction between vibhu and vyāpaka:

vyāpāka means “all-pervasive”; vibhu is the consequence, as far as size is concerned, of such all-pervasiveness, hence its opposite is “madhyama” (of middle=normal size). I may suggest: “all-pervasive” and “infinitely-extended”. See also Laine, Journal of Indian Philosophy 1998.