V. Eltschinger–on yogipratyakṣa

In the second chapter (“La doctrine métareligieuse de Dharmakīrti–unluckily enough the author does not spell out the meaning of “meta” in this case), p. 88, fn. 66, V. Eltsch. proposes the following verse:

PV. III.285-6:tasmād bhūtām abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evābhibhāvyate. bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphuṭākalpadhīphalam.

But I am not absolutely sure of how could something non-existing be seen in a non-conceptual (akalpa) way. Does not the very fact that it does not exist imply its being of conceptual nature? Luckily enough, V. Eltsch.'s translation adds that it just seems to be non-conceptual.

V. Eltschinger-III part

One of the main qualities of this book is that it stresses Dharmakīrti's statement that one needs a Sacred Text (in V.Eltsch.'s words: une Écriture) in order to initiate an activity. That is, although V.Eltsch. does not put it so explicitly, the other instruments of knowledge are reliable as far as the “material” world is concerned (I cannot pause here on the exact connotation that material would have in a Buddhist milieu and hope that the common sense understanding of it will suffice for the moment). They are reliable insofar as the description of the world as it is is concerned. But, they cannot tell one what he OUGHT to do. This thesis would be shared by Mīmāṃsakas, too. Hence, say the latter, the Veda has to be valid, otherwise there would be no key as to how to achieve (enduring) happiness. Buddhists, on the other hand, are content to say that the Buddhist texts, though not by themselves valid, are inferentially proven to be valid. My question is: where does the thesis of the non-derivability of the ought from the is derive from, within Indian Philosophy? In fact, it is not shared by, e.g., Naiyāyikas, who ground the validity of the Veda exactly in its epistemological validity insofar as our common world is concerned (namely, healing of poisons).

Vincent Eltschinger -II part

At the end of his first chapter, V.Eltsch. inscribes Dharmakīrti's contribution within the coeval Buddhist philosophy. One understands that 

Dharmakīrti dote ainsi le bouddhisme d'une philosophie complète, mobile et réputée ne faire appel qu'aux lumières ordinaires de la connaissance humaine (p. 64).

I am willing to agree with this analysis if it refers to the Buddhist milieu alone. Dharmakīrti was surely trying to enhance the blind faith of the other Buddhists whilst strengthening it with rational arguments. But I am not absolutely sure that he was also rationally convinced that those rational arguments would have been powerful enough to make everyone a Buddhist convert. In sum, rational arguments were thought by Dharmakīri to be powerful enough to make one's faith resist and to be eventually victorious in debates against Mīmāṃsakas and other opponents. But this does not mean that the same arguments could have effected a change of faith in those very opponents. Does V. Eltsch. agree?

Book discussion/Buchbesprechung: Vincent Eltschinger's “Penser l'autorité des Écritures”

The starting point of every discussion on this book is that it is an amazing achievement: more than 160 pp. of translation of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika and Svavṛtti which will enhance further studies on Buddhist and non-Buddhist epistemology and, even more important if possible, enable non-Sanskritist readers to have a glance of Dharmakīrti's arguments on the epistemological foundation of one's beliefs and actions.

The first lot of my comments is directed on the long introductory study which is, explains the author, only a methodological device to avoid an over-loaded annotation. In fact, the introductory study is sometimes (most of all in the first chapter: Contexte historique et idéologique –V. Eltschinger is a passionate historian), a page-turner. Sometimes, on the other hand, it resembles more a collection of arguments needed to understand the following translation and hence runs the risk to be either too long (to be a handy compendium for the translation) or too short (if one –as in my case– looks for a philosophical insight into the Buddhist-Mīmāṃsaka debate).

More in detail, my only genuine criticism is about §1.3.3, p. 45, where the author describes the Mīmāṃsā's understanding of the Veda as

Les Smṛti et les Purāṇa ne sont source autorisées de connaissance du dharma que parce qu'ils corroborent une révélation incréée, seule inscrite dans l'ordre même des choses (emphasis of the author).

This would hint at the idea that there is a natural order of things and that the Veda is part of it. On the other hand, I have rather the impression that the Veda is felt by Mīmāṃsakas to be of a complete different nature as our common experience and to be the only possible authority in its precinct. That is, as for dharma, there is no order of things which enables the Veda to be the only authority, rather, the realm of dharma is tantamount to Veda. Moreover, the Veda is an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) only as far as its prescriptive part is concerned. Hence, no descriptive knowledge of dharma can be driven out of it, whereas V. Eltschinger's passage and even more his hinting at the order of things seems to imply that the Veda has an epistemological validity in its descriptive rather then prescriptive passages.

Longer discussions on arthabhāvanā in Bhāṭṭa texts

The following quote has also be found in Mīmāṃsākoṣa. I will complete its translation in the next days.

ākhyātopasthitā arthabhāvanā kiṃ kena kathaṃ ity aṃśatrayaṃ krameṇāpekṣamāṇā “kim iṣṭaṃ kuryāt” ityākāṅkṣāyāṃ yāgasya kaṣṭatvena karaṇatvena ca asādhyatayā “yāgena anyad bhāvayet” iti (uttaram). tataḥ “kim idaṃ tat anyat?” ityākāṅkṣāyāṃ svargakāmapadasamarpitaṃ asiddhatayā sādhanāpekṣaṃ svargam eva arthabhāvanā bhāvyatvena svīkaroti. śrutivṛttyā hi padārthabhūtasya svargakāmasya bhāvyatvam ucyamānaṃ viśeṣyabodhe viśeṣaṇe svarge paryavasyati. tathā ca yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet iti phalitam. yāgakaraṇikā svargaphalikā pravṛttiḥ pravartanāviṣayaḥ iti bodhaḥ. yatra ca samabhivyāhṛtānupasthitaṃ phalaṃ tatra prakaraṇādinā teṣām apy abhāve arthavādena vidhisāpekṣeṇa (rātrisatreṣu), tasyāpy abhāve viśvajinnyāyena phalaviśeṣaḥ kalpyate. yady api puruṣapravṛttirūpabhāvanāniṣpādyo yāgaḥ tatra na karaṇaṃ, tathāpi phalāvacchinnabhāvanāyāṃ viśeṣaṇe karaṇatve (karaṇe) karaṇatvopacāraḥ iti phaloddeśyakapravartakakṛtiviṣayatvam eva atra karaṇatvam. daṇḍena ghataṃ karoti ityādau loke 'pi tathaiva karaṇatvam. kena ityāsyāpi kiṃviṣayiṇī kṛtiḥ svargasādhanaṃ ityarthaḥ ity anye. atra yāgakaraṇatvaviśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā iti prāñcaḥ. vastutaḥ karaṇatvaṃ yāgasya saṃbandho vākyārthaḥ. evaṃ jyotiṣṭomādes tatra abhedenānvayo nirābādhaḥ. itthaṃ ca kathaṃ vinaṣṭena yāgena svargo bhāvyaḥ iti pratītyanavasāne antarā apūrvaṃ kṛtvā iti saṃbadhyate. tataḥ “katham apūrvaṃ yāgena kartavyaṃ” iti apūrvabhāvanāyāṃ itthaṃbhāvena saṃyujyamānam itikartavyatājātaṃ apūrvaprayuktam ity ucyate. tataḥ prakārāpekṣāyāṃ “samidho yajati” ityādivākyaiḥ iṣṭaviśeṣāpekṣaiḥ svādhikāravākyaikavākyatayā “darśapūrṇamāsabhāvanā prayājādibhāvanopetā apūrvaṃ sādhayati” ity avagate prayājādīnāṃ tādarthyena samanvaye paścāt upakāratvaṃ (upakārakatvaṃ) kalpyate. tad ayaṃ bhāṭṭamate bodhakramaḥ. “svargakāmaniṣṭhā yāgakaraṇikā svargaphalikā prayājādītikartavyatākā bhāvanā” ity arthabhāvanābodhaḥ. “vidhiniṣṭhā śaktigrahakaraṇikā stutyarthavādopakṛtā pravartanā” iti śabdabhāvanābodhaḥ śaktikalpanena lakṣaṇayā vā upapadyate. tato 'varuddhā arthabhāvanā niruktapravartanāviṣayaḥ ity ekavākyatayā mahāvākyārthabodhaḥ. ata eva vidhyuparaktā bhāvanā liṅarthaḥ iti bhāṭṭasiddhāntaḥ. vidhiḥ pravartanā taduparaktā tadviśiṣṭā arthabhāvanā liṅpratipādyā ity arthaḥ. arthabhāvanāviśeṣaṇatvenaiva śabdabhāvanāyā anvayaḥ rājādikṛtājñādeḥ tathaivānvayāt. tadanvayena yogyatvena pravartanāyām api balavadaniṣṭhānanubandhīṣṭasādhanatvaṃ labhyate. “na surāṃ pibet” ityādau pratiṣedhavākyārtho 'pi ittham evonneyaḥ evam anye 'pi anvayabodhāḥ svayamūhyāḥ iti. (Mīmāṃsācintāmaṇi, pp. 92-93).

Approximate translation (for the time being, I did not polish the English form of this translation, which is only meant as a guide-line through the Sanskrit text):

The arthabhāvanā lead [to the listener] by verbal forms (ākhyāta), expects three components [answering], in due order [the following questions] “What [has to be brought about]?”, “By means of what?” and “In which way?”

As for the expectation “Which desirable [thing] should one do?”, since the sacrifice cannot be the thing to be realised, since it is [by itself not desirable at all, but rather] grievous, and since it is instrumental, the answer is “through the sacrifice, one should cause to be something else”. Hence, [when one asks] “What is this other [thing]?”, since [heaven] has not been accomplished and needs an instrument to be realised, the bhāvanā accepts heaven alone, delivered by the word «the one who is desirous of heaven» [in the prescription «The one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Full and New Moon Sacrifices»], as the thing it has to cause to be. […] Hence, the [prescription] ends up by meaning “through the sacrifice, one should cause to be heaven”.

I have no keys as for prāñca. Who are those “Eastern” Mīmāṃsakas?

Besides the problem of arthabhāvanā, it is impressive how such analyses of arthabhāvanā and its components are common throughout Bhāṭṭa texts. I read similar depictions in the Bhāṭṭa pūrvapakṣinaḥ of Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya as well as in Āpadeva's Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa and so on.

Various Bhāṭṭas on arthabhāvanā

As reported in the Mīmāṃsākoṣa:

arthabhāvanā eva kārakaviśiṣṭarūpeṇa vākyārtho mīmāṃsakamate (Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa p. 73).

arthabhāvanā eva śabdabhāvanābhāvyā (Mīmāṃsācintāmaṇi p. 91).

arthabhāvanā ca pacati pākaṃ karoti iti karotisāmānādhikaraṇyāt sarvākhyātapadavācyā (Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa p. 74).

arthabhāvanāṃ vidhipratiṣedhau sākṣāt viṣayīkurutaḥ. taddvārā tu tadviśeṣaṇāni kārakāṇi. tad uktaṃ tadbhūtādhikaraṇe “viśiṣṭāṃ bhāvanāṃ prāpya vṛttir vidhiniṣedhayoḥ” iti (Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa p. 74).

arthabhāvanāyāḥ cetanamātrāśrayatve 'pi śabdabhāvanāyāḥ cetanāśrayatvāyogaḥ (Nyāyasudhā, p. 578).

arthabhāvanāyāḥ sarvākhyātavācyatvam (Somanātha's Mayūkhamālikā, ad 1.2.1, p. 4).

The Nyāyasudhā's quote is interesting in view of the Pārthasārathi-Someśvara debate about bhāvanā as prayatna (implying a cetana agent) or pravṛtti (so that it agent could even be a non-sentient one).

Arthabhāvanā in Kumārila

yadā hi sarvākhyātānuvartinī karotidhātuvācyā puruṣavyāpārarūpā bhāvanā avagatā bhavati, tadā tadviśeṣāḥ sāmānyākhyātavyatiriktaśabdaviśeṣavācyāḥ vidhipratiṣedhabhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānādayaḥ pratīyante. pacati, apākṣīt, pakṣyati, pacet, na pacet iti (TV ad 2.1.1.1, p. 378).

That is,

When indeed the bhāvanā –which has the form of a human activity, can be expressed by the verbal root “to do” [and] is present in all finite verbal forms– is understood, then optative (lit. prescriptions and prohibitions), past, future, present etc. –which are expressed by a certain word (i.e., their specific verbal ending) distinct from the general finite verbal ending [and] are its (the bhāvanā's) characteristics– are [also] understood. For instance, “he cooks”, “he cooked”, “he will cook”, “he should cook”, “he should not cook”.