Signification of verbs in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā

Prābhākaras oppose the Bhāṭṭa view that verbal endings (ākhyātas) express the objective bhāvanā and verbal roots are only used because endings cannot be employed by themselves. On the contrary, Prābhākaras maintain that these very verbal roots express the activity typical of any verb. Verbal endings express instead only the number of the subject implied by the verbal root. Is this activity (vyāpāra) the same as the Bhāṭṭa bhāvanā? At first sight not, in so far as according to the Prābhākaras verbal roots can express all kinds of vyāpāras, including instances such as "he sleeps". And, as far as I know, "he sleeps" does not express a bhāvanā, as it cannot be synonym of "he makes an effort" and so on. That is, vyāpāra seems broader than bhāvanā. 

Bhāvanā in Śabara

Within Mīmāṃsā, the term "bhāvanā" is found already in Śabara (see, e.g., his commentary ad MS 2.1.1) as indicating the activity of a person, designated by the verbal forms and directed to an object. In fact, such an activity is further specified by its requiring an object, an instrument and a procedure (respectively answering the question “what [does one do]?”, “through what?” and “how?”). In accordance to such an interpretation, Śabara paraphrases svargakāmo yajeta as yāgena svargaṃ bhavati. That is, an object/aim (according to the polysemy of the Sanskrit term artha, noticeably within Mīmāṃsā, see MS 1.1.5 et passim) is connected to the bhāvanā, the root of the verb is read as an instrument (yāgena), and the verbal action is designated by the conjugated verbal form alone (bhavati). 

Bhāvanā

The bhāvanā theory of action is one of the main contributions of Mīmāṃsā to Indian philosophy, as proved by the fact that it is widely used even in non-Mīmāṃsā contexts (see, e.g., Jayaratha's commentary of Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka, which adheres strictly to this Mīmāṃsā theory and terminology). It also offers an account of the meaning of verbs and verbal suffixes which differs from the one provided by Grammarians in so far as it stresses the centrality of action and of prescriptive speech over and above descriptive one. In the following (and previous) posts, a discussion of the initial meaning of bhāvanā in its two aspects of śabda- and artha-bhāvanā will hopefully throw some light on the development of the theory from Śabara through Kumārila to late Mīmāṃsā authors.

Sanskrit usages: ākhyāta

What does ākhyāta mean? Until now, I have found at least three possible acceptations of this term:

1) verbal suffix (that is, the suffix affixed to a root, dhātu, in order to make a finite verbal form, or an infinite, or a gerund)

2) verbal form (that is, the suffix+the modifications of the verbal base, except the root part)

3) finite verb

The third meaning is presupposed by classifications of words found in Nirukta and Mahābhāṣya and opposing nouns, prepositions and ākhyāta. However, in such classifications the point of what a root-part is is just not taken into account (one just classifies words as they can be actually found in usage). The first translation mostly fits, and liṅ-s are in different parts of a single text (Tantrarahasya) called both ākhyāta and pratyaya (as if the two terms were synonyms). However, 1) clashes with the above referred classification. So, the second translation seems the best one, although it presupposes a formalization independent of the actual morphemes (that is, if ākhāta were to mean “verbal form” as explained in 2), one would not be able to indicate it). A dhātu or a pratyaya can be indicated as, e.g., kṛ-, a verbal form cannot, since it “lies” both in the ending and in modifications of the root. Were Indian authors able to such a level of abstraction? Maybe yes, since they could conceive the coexistence of an ākyāta-part and a liṅ-part in the same ending of, say, yajeta. Yet, “verbal form” is not perspicuous enough.

Sanskrit usages: ācārya -2

As already hinted at in a previous post, the author of the Tarkajvālā (a commentary on the  Madhyamahṛdayakārikā by Bhāviveka) calls the author of the text he is commenting upon “ācārya”. In order to show that this is no evidence for the fact that the Tarkajvālā has not been authored by Bhāviveka (who would then refer to himself as ācārya), Olle Qvarnström refers to a passage in the Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya where Vasubandhu refers to himself as ācārya (ucyata ity ācāryavacanam darśayati, Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya 8,9). See Olle Qvarnström, Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective. The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamahṛdayakārikā, Lund 1989: 21.

However, Helmut Krasser (Bhavya and Dharmakīrti Relationship, forthcoming), thinks (out of stronger evidences too) that it is more likely to imagine that the Tarkajvālā has been written by (a) student(s) of Bhāviveka, taking notes during his teacher's explanations. Hence, ācārya would refer to his own teacher, against some evidences summed up in a previous post on this argument. Krasser further suggests that it would be worthwhile to examine whether even the Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya has been “written down by Vasubandhu himself or explained to some students. Such a study certainly should include passages such as samāpta ānuṣaṅgikaprasaṅgaḥ”.

Last but not least, Krasser refers that “another example where the 'author' in the commentary refers to himself as ācārya is, as mentioned in Seyfort Ruegg ([On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya in D.S.Ruegg and L. Schmithausen (eds.) Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka, Leiden] 1990:64 and n. 20) found in Haribhadrasūri's Anekāntajayapatāka”. The discussion should/might be enlarged in order to consider the numerous instances of autocommentaries where the author of the text is referred to as if it where someone else (see, e.g. Utpaladeva's Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti).

Distinction between linguistic and external reality

In his contribution to a recent symposium (Does Asia think differently? –Symposium zu Ehre Ernst Steinkellners), Johannes Bronkhorst answered that yes, there is a substantial difference between “our” thought and the Indian one, in so far as the latter does not distinguish between purely linguistic problems and genuine ones. For instance, Indians care for the status of an object which is linguistically present before its actual existence, such as a pot in “the potter makes the pot”. However, many Buddhist schools seem to aptly distinguish between the two and so do, as far as my knowledge reaches, at least also Mīmāṃsakas. For instance, Rāmānujācārya speaks of karman and kriyāphala as two distinct realities (cf. Tantrarahasya, IV §3.13.2: kriyāphalaśali karma).

V. Eltschinger–IV part

A criticism against Dharmakīrti as presented by V.Eltsch.:

The end of the second chapter (pp. 110-114) is dedicated to the establishment of the validity of whatever has been said by the Buddha through the validity (inferentially established) of what he said in regard to the Four Noble Truths. But how does one know that a reliable speaker of X (=the four noble truths) will be reliable also in a fully different sphere? One does not expect an expert of anatomy to be reliable in regard to codicology! Even the fact that the Buddha must be compassionate, since he communicated to us the four noble truths, is not enough, because he could have been compassionate and willing to help, but still not an expert in a certain area.