Validity of the Veda and of other Sacred Texts

The debates on the validity of the Veda and of other Sacred Texts depend either on the Mīmāṃsā or on the Nyāya approach (or on both). That is, either they employ the argument of the authorlessness of Sacred Texts in order to prove their validity, or they ground it on their author, God himself. An instance of it is the following passage of Jayaratha's commentary on Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka (§IV) (on this theme, see also my italian blog, http://filosofiaindiana.blogspot.com/):

On the other hand there can be such a possibility in regard to a [statement] which has not been employed by an intelligent [author]. Hence [Abhinavagupta] stated:

[Such] suspicion of having a false meaning, in fact, could always occur in regard to the doctrine (nigama) which has been completed in this way without [the participation of] any intelligent [author], [and hence] bears the nature of ether [which is also uncreated but certainly not a valid instrument of knowledge just because of being uncreated] || 233 ||

Indeed, in regard to this doctrine, that is, in regard to the Vedic teaching, always, that is, at the time of hearing a prescriptive or commendatory sentence, there occurs a doubt of reflective (prekṣāpūrvakārin) [people] of having a false meaning, that is, regarding its having an untrue meaning –this is possible, since this (Veda), has been completed in this way, that is, as having the nature of prescriptions and commendatory statements according to the other opinion without [the participation of] any intelligent [author], that is, as something which has not been authored by an intelligent person, like the roar of a thunder. For this very reason it has been said [that it] bears the nature of ether, because of being almost empty [of meaning] through its having no meaning. With exactly such intention it has been said in another text:

«People have faith in the Vedic sentences relying on that very revered Lord, without beginning, who is a reliable speaker | On the other hand, no clever one at all would reach confidence because of their having no author. So has been explained before || » || 233 ||

But when the Supreme Lord alone, who is tantamount to an uninterrupted knowledge, is present in the form of an Instruction (sāstra), which suspicion of falsity could there be? Hence, [Abhinavagupta] stated:

God, who is the Instruction, quite full of the entire nature [which derives out of His] uninterrupted knowledge, abodes [in the Sacred Texts]: there cannot be anywhere [any] falsity || 234 ||

There cannot be anywhere [any] falsity: for this, the cause is the first part. || 234 ||

But we have learnt that the Lord is the author of all Instructions (śāstra). Not, on the other hand, that He alone is their essence. This never heard before (apūrva) statement, why has it been said? Having so doubted, [Abhinavagupta] stated:

Like the Lord, desirous [of it], wishes to exist in the form of the existence |

So he abodes [as the Instructions], since he wishes to exist in the form of setting forth (abhidhā-) His own nature of it || 235 ||

This means: like indeed the Supreme Lord is desirous to exist in the form of the existence of knower and knowable, etc., –which is tantamount to [everything] which can be expressed– because of the greatness of His desire, so he exists as the nature of everything which can be expressed. So, that is, in the same way, through the repetition (āvṛtti) of the word “so”, he is desirous of existing in the form of setting forth, that is, expressing, His own nature –which excludes (apavah-) everything else– of the whole expressible, being the knower and the knowable–, so he abodes as the nature of Instructions, which is the fact of being expressive. || 235 ||

Validity of commendatory statements

According to a standard Mīmāṃsā rule, commendatory statements (arthavādas) are to be understood only together with the prescription which they supplement. Hence, they have no independent meaning. However, Uttaramīmāṃsakas, i.e., Vedāntins of all sorts ground their doctrines basically on statements which are deemed to be arthavādas by (Pūrva)mīmāṃsakas. Does this mean that they altogether deny the above mentioned rule? Usually not. Rather, they acknowledge two kinds of commendatory statements, the ones which are supplementary to prescriptions and the independent ones. Interestingly enough, according to Jayaratha in his commentary on Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka (§IV), one and the same commendatory statement can have both aspects.

Even a commendatory statement, whenever it regards another prescription or [prohibition], |

can be [in itself] untrue; in case it is independent, on the other hand, it is prescriptive || 236 ||

Whenever indeed a commendatory statement, whose nature is eulogy or despise, becomes part of another prescriptive sentence, that is, a prescription or a prohibition, then it can be untrue and there is no flaw, since it does not point to its own nature. In fact, its meaning as it is heard is not something to be known, rather it is something to be prescribed or prohibited, so that . For this very reason the experts on sentence (i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas) say that its validity (prāmāṇya) derives precisely out of its constituting a single sentence with the prescriptive sentence. As [they] stated:

«Hence those commendatory statements partake of the validity because they are a single sentence with the prescription».

To elaborate:

in regard to the commendatory statement

«He cried (rud-); what cried is the Rudra-ness of Rudra»,

which is to be supplemented to this prescription:

«silver should not be given on a bed of kuśa grass»

no roaring of Rudra should be understood, rather

«Before one year has lapsed there [will] be crying in the home of the one who gives silver on a bed of kuśa grass, hence silver should not be given on a bed of kuśa grass». Precisely this commendatory statement, on the other hand, if it would not become a part of another [prescription], would be prescriptive, i.e., it would cause one to understand [its] meaning as it has been heard. This is the meaning [of the TĀ verse]. In regard to the commendatory statement beginning with “he roared”, in fact, there is precisely this true meaning, which is the fact of letting known what has happened:

«Rudra cried. A tear of him felt out and became silver».

[The above said meaning is true] because there is [indeed] an oblation (iṣṭi) through the truth of many happenings similar to this one.

Mīmāṃsā thought outside Mīmāṃsā school

Jayaratha, the author of a learned commentary on Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka employs Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic tools in order to prove that a certain statement, found in a Śaiva Scripture and directly contradicting the Vedic mainstream, is to be followed. So, interestingly enough, Mīmāṃsā tools are implemented completely outside their precinct, in a theistic and non-Vedic (though not anti-Vedic) frame. The following discussion is excerpted from his commentary on TĀ, IV. Verses in bold are Abhinavagupta's one.

(The discussion originates out of a śaiva verse saying that there is no purity nor impurity.)

But [an objector may state]: the distinction (viniścaya) referring to pure, impure, etc., occurs because of a command (codanā) [hence, it cannot be invalidated] || 228 ||

A command is a prescriptive sentence, as it has been said:

«A command is a statement inciting [one] to undertake an action» (ŚBh ad 1.1.2)

What has been prescribed by that as being pure, is pure whereas what is [prescribed] as other [than pure], is other [than pure]. Because there is a smṛti:

The apertures which are over the navel are all fit for sacrifice |

those which are located under [the navel] are not fit for sacrifice. And from the body alone are the impurities removed ||

With the mention (grahaṇa) of “etc.” [in the TĀ verse] what it eatable and what is not, etc., is [meant]. || 228 ||

[Obj.:] «But if indeed the very command is the condition for the distinction between pure and impure, then what flaw would there be [in obeying it]?» But also in regard to the non-distinction between them this very command pronounced by Śiva is the condition: “There is in this case no purity nor impurity”. Hence [Abhinavagupta] stated:

Let it be so, nonetheless this very command has been pronounced by Śiva |

«But if there is no distinction as far as the status of command of both [prescriptions], which one shall be valid (pramāṇa), so that relying on that we can prescribe the distinction between pure and impure?» Having so doubted, [Abhinavagupta] stated:

Which one shall be true? If you ask so, [I answer] that this [argument] has been expanded in another [text] || 229 ||

In another [text], means that here, on the other hand, [this argument] will not be expanded, for fear of [composing] [too] extensive a book. Here, indeed, a word endowed with the [appropriate] convention is independent in regard to the general conveying of [its] meaning [but] [its] dependency is unavoidable in regard to the ascertainment of a meaning different from the above said (i.e., conventional) one, since [in order to do that] it [has to] refer to a person (i.e., its author). Hence, [a certain statement] becomes valid just because it has been said by a reliable [author], else, on the other hand, it is certainly invalid. So it is ascertained. And therefore, in case of this very (vā) Vedic command, the single Supreme Lord alone –who has directly perceived all elements (dharma) and has as His aim the desire to raise the whole world – is the foundation (nibandhana) of [its] validity, because all Instructions have been taught by Him. Nor is it possible to say that the Vedic command is without an author, since it is endowed with a certain arrangement [of words] [and] since all arrangements have an author. And hence, the truth does not differ in both commands. So, we do not know relying on what we have to distinguish (viveka) between pure and impure, etc. Nor is it correct [to say] that the two are reciprocally in a relation of suspender and suspended, since they have the same strength, because one does not seize the condition of a feebleness in one of the two. [PP:] But there is indeed a condition of feebleness in one of the two, because all other Sacred Texts are outside the Veda [and, hence, less reliable than it]. As it has been stated WHERE?:

«Generally, everyone follows (anuvṛt-) the Vedic path (vartman) |

A Tradition (āgama) which is external to the Veda, on the other hand, is certainly a fraud (vañcanā) ||»

And therefore the invalidation of all other Traditions has indeed the Veda as its author, hence the distinction (vibhāga) between pure and impure is correct because it relies precisely on it. || 229 ||

[S:] But if it is so, why should not also that [śaiva command] invalidate (bādha) the Vedic commands, due to [their] being external in regard to it? In fact, we do not detect (utpaś-) any strong reason in one of the two, so that the other would be necessarily invalidated. Hence (tad), [Abhinavagupta] stated:

If [you say that] the Vedic [command] invalidates [the śaiva one], then why could not it be the opposite? |

[PP:] But if it is so, both would be invalid, since they would be reciprocally hindered, so nothing would be established. [S:] It is not so, because a strong reason of validity, namely the fact of having been composed by the Lord, is present in both, [PP:] Then, this is even more a reason of invalidity, since although there is a single teacher they contradict (vyāhan-) each other. [S:] It is not so, because they have been taught in this way according to the difference of the responsible person [hearing them]. In fact, the Lord has commanded purity and [impurity] in general as referring (viṣaya) to all people, whereas as referring to specific [people] [he has commanded] this [śaiva command]. Hence, in the tswo there is no flaw amounting to invalidity. Therefore, the truth of both commands is the same, because of their [respective] situation, due to the fact that they have a different content. So it is established. ||

But how can their truth be the same, since the prescription about purity, etc., has been invalidated on a certain theme, although it was [generally] active (pravṛtti) because of its having as content all people? Having so doubted, [Abhinavagupta] stated:

If you consider correctly the invalidation [you see that] it can be made by an exceptional rule (apavāda), because of [its] having a specific content, whereas the [general] prescription has been prescribed in general | 230cd-231ab |

If indeed you understand correctly the functioning of the invalidation, then no command will loose its truth. To elaborate: the prescription of an exceptional rule, which is specific because it has no [general] occasion [of application], if there is an occasion (avakāśa) [for its application], always invalidates the universal (utsarga) prescription, which is general –so say the experts on sentences (i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas). The universal rule, in fact, although it has gained stability through applying to all contents, defines a specific content for the exceptional prescription and then remains non invalidated on [all] other contents. As has stated the author of the Cūrṇikā (possibly the Mahābhāṣya):

«Having defined the content of the exceptional [rule], then the universal [rule] remains»

For this very reason, although it is invalidated in some [cases], its invalidity cannot be suspected, since on [all] other contents it is well grounded as valid. And this invalidation is of two kinds: [invalidation] because of achieving the same effect or because of contradiction. Among them,

The offering of water with a ladle, prescribed in general [with]

«he should offer water with a ladle (camasa)»

is invalidated by the prescription of milking a cow, which is an exception, because of having a specific content, that is, one who desires cattle

«In the case of one who desires cattle, he should offer with the milking of a cow»

because it achieves the same effect, that is, offering of a liquid (ap).

The eight-edged sacrificial pole, though generally prescribed as having as content all rituals, [in]

«the sacrificial pole is eight-edged»

is invalidated with this exceptional prescription because of contradiction:

«In the case of the Vājapeya, [the sacrificial pole] is four-edged» || 230 ||

But even if it is so, what [has this to do] in regard to the [argument] we are dealing with? –Having so doubted, [Abhinavagupta] stated:

And purity and impurity, generally prescribed, are indeed invalidated in regard to the person who knows the reality. And so is it in this [verse] –so is it explained || 231cd-232ab ||

That is (arthāt): these purity and impurity, though prescribed as having as content all people, generally, through a Vedic command, in case of the one who knows the reality are indeed invalidated, that is, they are not non-invalidated, because of contradiction. In this regard the cause is And so is it in this [verse] –so is it explained. This means the prescriptive sentence pronounced [above], having as content the one who knows the reality and being exceptional:

«Here there is no purity nor impurity […]» || 231 ||

[PP:] But in this case it is not correct to say that it is a prescriptive sentence, because the distinction between pure and impure is seen in common experience without any invalidating instance, since [such an invalidating instance] would be contradicted by perception and the other instruments of knowledge. Therefore, this is certainly a commendatory statement (arthavāda) [and not a prescription, hence it has no epistemological value]. That, in fact, is usually (bhūmnā) said to exist as a single sentence together with the prescription, and for this reason it has a meaning only insofar as it aims at that and not by itself. For this very reason there is no contradiction with the other instruments of knowledge, because it does not point at its own nature. In fact, due to a commendatory statement the faith in the prescription increases, so that a person initiates an activity in its regard in an attentive way. As has been said:

«The potency of prescriptions faints, the cognition of [the prescription's] praiseworthiness enhances it» (cf. avasīdantī hi vidhiśaktiḥ prāśastyajñānenottabhyate VM II).

Therefore, is this [verse about purity and impurity] just the commendatory statement subsidiary –insofar as it excites interest through its praise– to the prescription which is directly stated in Sacred Texts,

«He should not adore the liṅga consisting of earth, minerals, jewels, etc.|

he should sacrifice to the inner liṅga, in which all created things vanish ||»

or to the one which one can deduce,

«one should become a yogin completely free of conceptualisations»?

Having so doubted, [Abhinavagupta] stated:

And there cannot be any suspicion of being a commendatory statement or [any other non prescriptive sort of statement] in case of a sentence [uttered] by the Great Lord || 232 ||

As has been said:

«This Scripture (tantra) is a prescriptive text, there are never commendatory statements |

[And], in the same way:

«The Tradition of Śiva is not a commendatory statement | »

Bhāvanā in Indian Philosophy

The theory of bhāvanā widely influenced Indian philosophy outside Mīmāṃsā. Besides Mīmāṃsā description, I read and translated Jayanta's account in Nyāyamañjarī 5 and an interesting application of arthabhāvanā and prescription as śabdabhāvanā in Jayaratha's commentary ad Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka. Interestingly enough, the terminology implemented by Jayaratha –as within all Mīmāṃsā descriptions I am aware of– is surprisingly the same.

Signification of verbs in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā

Prābhākaras oppose the Bhāṭṭa view that verbal endings (ākhyātas) express the objective bhāvanā and verbal roots are only used because endings cannot be employed by themselves. On the contrary, Prābhākaras maintain that these very verbal roots express the activity typical of any verb. Verbal endings express instead only the number of the subject implied by the verbal root. Is this activity (vyāpāra) the same as the Bhāṭṭa bhāvanā? At first sight not, in so far as according to the Prābhākaras verbal roots can express all kinds of vyāpāras, including instances such as "he sleeps". And, as far as I know, "he sleeps" does not express a bhāvanā, as it cannot be synonym of "he makes an effort" and so on. That is, vyāpāra seems broader than bhāvanā. 

Bhāvanā in Śabara

Within Mīmāṃsā, the term "bhāvanā" is found already in Śabara (see, e.g., his commentary ad MS 2.1.1) as indicating the activity of a person, designated by the verbal forms and directed to an object. In fact, such an activity is further specified by its requiring an object, an instrument and a procedure (respectively answering the question “what [does one do]?”, “through what?” and “how?”). In accordance to such an interpretation, Śabara paraphrases svargakāmo yajeta as yāgena svargaṃ bhavati. That is, an object/aim (according to the polysemy of the Sanskrit term artha, noticeably within Mīmāṃsā, see MS 1.1.5 et passim) is connected to the bhāvanā, the root of the verb is read as an instrument (yāgena), and the verbal action is designated by the conjugated verbal form alone (bhavati). 

Bhāvanā

The bhāvanā theory of action is one of the main contributions of Mīmāṃsā to Indian philosophy, as proved by the fact that it is widely used even in non-Mīmāṃsā contexts (see, e.g., Jayaratha's commentary of Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka, which adheres strictly to this Mīmāṃsā theory and terminology). It also offers an account of the meaning of verbs and verbal suffixes which differs from the one provided by Grammarians in so far as it stresses the centrality of action and of prescriptive speech over and above descriptive one. In the following (and previous) posts, a discussion of the initial meaning of bhāvanā in its two aspects of śabda- and artha-bhāvanā will hopefully throw some light on the development of the theory from Śabara through Kumārila to late Mīmāṃsā authors.