Meaning of suffixes

The Mīmāṃsā account of language is among the most ancient linguistic theories in India.

This is not to say that Mīmāṃsā theories are directly comparable with those of Western linguistics. They would probably be collocated, from a Western point of view, somewhere between semantics, pragmatics, textual linguistics and speech act theory.

In fact, Mīmāṃsā authors developed their theories from their focus on hermeneutics of the sacrificial portions of the Veda. Hence, they stress the role of the context of whole passages, they emphasise the role of the listener (since the Veda is by them believed to be authorless), and above all they concentrate on the way sacrificial prescriptions act on their listeners.

Their inquiry on the way sacrificial prescriptions work starts with a survey on what linguistic element expresses a prescription. As most other Indian authors, Mīmāṃsā thinkers assume that every morpheme has a distinct meaning which is made explicit by means of a paraphrase (vivaraṇa).

In case of prescriptions, the linguistic elements most likely to express them are the verbal suffixes commonly associated with prescriptions, namely the suffixes denoting the optative (called liṅ by Indian Grammars and also in Mīmāṃsā), the imperative (loṭ), the Vedic subjunctive (leṭ) and the gerundive (tavya); moreover, due to the Mīmāṃsā stress on the point of view of the listener, also present indicative forms may convey an exhortative meaning, if the semantics of the passage requires an exhortative meaning.

From now onwards I will refer to all these cases, for brevity's sake, just as “exhortative” verbal suffixes.

Due to their chronological priority and to their link with the influential theory of ritual elaborated by the Mīmāṃsā authors, Mīmāṃsā 'linguistic' theories extensively influenced all other philosophical schools.

More in detail, the Mīmāṃsā approach predominates even over the Vyākaraṇa's one whenever accounts of the agentive component of verbs or of exhortative sentences are at stake.

Notwithstanding the peculiarity of the Mīmāṃsā point of view sketched above, and since Western theories of language consider exhortative expressions as less prototypical and regard instead affirmative sentences as the standard, Mīmāṃsā theories may have some significance in proposing new fields of investigation for today's analyses, too.

Bhāvanā and Speech Acts

Several Mīmāṃsā texts focus on the definition of what is exactly the specific force (bhāvanā) characteristic of exhortative verbal endings. Some discussants (noticeably Maṇḍana Miśra) propose that exhortation is just a meaning expressed by exhortative expressions, more in detail, the meaning is that the action to be undertaken is the means to something desired. According to this account, exhortative expressions would not differ from affirmative ones in so far as all would just express an (external) meaning. Kumārila talks of a "linguistic force" (śabdabhāvanā) in regard to the exhortative verbal endings, but he does not specify the link between this force and the endings connected to it (in TV ad 2.1.1 he claims that they "say" [āhuḥ] it). Other Bhāṭṭas maintain that the linguistic force is a function (vyāpāra) of exhortative verbal endings. Their account of this function is not fully clear, but it seems to imply that exhortative expressions are identified through the function they perform. Finally, Pārthasārathi Miśra proposes a synthesis by saying that exhortative verbal endings express an incitement, which is further defined, in the case of Vedic sentences, as the cognition that the action to be undertaken is a means to something desired. Is this a sort of perlocutionary speech act?

Is the Linguistic Bhāvanā an Illocutionary Force?

The concept of Illocutionary Force seems to be of use for a better understanding of Kumārila's linguistic bhāvanā. In fact, this is not purely a morphological entity, that is, it is not just the same as the optative and the other verbal endings expressing it. On the other hand, it is also not a 'referent' in the sense of a physical entity. Rather, it is a speech act having an intrinsic force. Austin usually calls commands "illocutionary speech acts", because they are intended to have a performative character. However, the Veda is believed by Mīmāṃsakas to be authorless, hence the speaker and his intention cannot play any role. So, the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts fades. The latter are speech acts causing effects on their listener, such as the fact of being incited to act, or of becoming embarassed or alarmed. They are not always clearly distinguished and have been rarely used in linguistic theories. A linguistic bhāvanā has certainly perlocutionary effects, but there cannot be –I think– a "perlocutionary force" since perlocutionary speech acts are not intended to be such and are only judged through their consequences.

Bhāvanā: Mīmāṃsā theories of action outside Mīmāṃsā

Frauwallner (Bhāvanā und Vidhiḥ bei Maṇḍanamiśra, WZKM 1938 p.215) writes that Mīmāṃsā epistemology is of significance for the whole Indian philosophy. On the other hand, the bhāvanā theory's significance were restricted to Mīmāṃsā alone, because of its direct link to Mīmāṃsā exegesis of Vedic sacrifices. But, first, Mīmāṃsā sacrificial exegesis influenced other schools having to do with sacrifices (such as several Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava ones). Secondly, the theory of bhāvanā is, within Mīmāṃsā, directly linked to the meaning of verbs and is, in this way, relevant to all other linguistic theories. It is hence depicted in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī in book 5, one of the ones dedicated to śabda. The importance of the bhāvanā theory outside Mīmāṃsā is testified by: Jayaratha's commentary on Abhinavagupta's Tantrāloka, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī (book 5), Prakāśātman's Śabdanirṇaya and Ānandapūrṇa's commentary thereon, Ānandapūrṇa's Nyāyacandrikā. But this seems to have not lasted so long, since no one of these texts dates after the xiii century.

Nāvyanyāya seems to have neglected the bhāvanā theory and the fact that there is just a cursory reference to it in Gāṅgeśa seems to hint at the possibility that it was already out of fashion.

Concrete Actions and Mental Efforts

(śyena altar scheme)

Rāmānujācārya depicts Kumārila's position about arthabhāvanā as follows:

The arthabhāvanā ("bringing about" force) is a human effort, his undertaking of an activity (arthabhāvanā puruṣaprayatnas tatpravṛttir iti yāvat).

If Rāmānujācārya's interpretation of Kumārila is right (as I am inclined to think), then Kumārila, against Nyāya, does not differentiate between an effort and its concrete realisation. Consequently, Mīmāṃsakas (see, again, Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya) count cognition (jñāna), desire (icchā) and effort (prayatna) as a complete sequence, whereas Nyāya texts usually add 'action' at the end. The non-separation of effort and action puts the whole burden of action in the moment of its initiation (called pra-vṛtti) and is IMHO linked to the Mīmāṃsā lack of interest for the actual performance of sacrifices. Enough, maintain Mīmāṃsakas, that the sacrifice is enjoined (even the avoidance to perform what has been enjoined does not alter the state of affairs of its having been enjoined).

But later authors, even Mīmāṃsaka ones, segment again arthabhāvanā into vyāpāra and prayatna, thus annihilating the idea that the actual performance of an action is not relevant to its status.

(I am grateful to Hugo David for having made me reflect about Khaṇḍadeva and Mādhava).

A Palmistry example in Indian philosophical texts

In Rāmānujācārya's Tantrarahasya, an example echoing palmistry runs as follows:

The being a means to realise what is desired (iṣṭasādhana) does not incite (prayuj-) [one] to undertake an action (pravṛtti), since no undertaking of action is [commonly] seen in regard to present (since one is already eating, no action needs to be undertaken) and past eating, etc., which are a means to realise satisfaction (tṛpti), [and] since even in regard to future means to realise results, such as (auspicious) bodily marks (lakṣ-), which indicate (sūc-) good fortune and are made known by the experts of palmistry (sāmudrika), no action is undertaken (pravṛtti)¹, [and] since, similarly, there is no activation when the means to realise (sādhana) future results, like rain and sunshine (ātapa), depend on fate (daivika).

The same example is found in Śālikanātha's Vākyārthamātṛkā and in Prakāśātman's Śabanirṇaya. In his (still unpublished) translation of the latter, Hugo David mentions also Maṇḍana Miśra's Vidhiviveka, its commentary (Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāyakāṇikā) and Gāṅgeśa. He then refers the latter's explanation, according to which a child, to which a palm-reader has said he will become a king, does not undertake any action, though he desires this destiny and knows all means to achieve it. 

Though this is possible, the passage mentioned above does not favour this interpretation, insofar as palmistry is mentioned as in itself a future means to achieve something desired (bhaviṣyatsv api phalasādhaneṣu). It is not said that someone does not undertake an action in regard to a future result, indicated by fortune tellers. And what would this lack of action point to? Gāṅgeśa just says that one does not always undertake an action in regard to a future result, whereas here the point is the future means of a (necessarily future) result.

 The gist of the passage, opposing bhaviṣyatsu phalasādhaneṣu and bhaviṣyatphalasādhaneṣu seems to indicate that those auspicious marks will become means for the arousal of good fortune, whereas for the time being they just indicate (sūc-) it. In fact, according to the Indian study of bodily marks, bodily marks change throughout one's life according to one's being. Again (but I could not find any direct statement supporting that), those changed marks are the cause of one's good fortune, etc. Still, one does not undertake any activity in order to modify one's bodily signs.

Role of Sanskrit Studies

Several books have been recently published in Italy on the issue of the role of humanistic studies. They stress the importance of, say, Latin studies against the cultural loss the present world is allegedly experiencing. Apart from the solutions proposed, they all face an interesting challenge, one Sanskritists should, i.m.h.o., also consider. To put the point in brutal terms, Can we justify the amount of (often public) money spent for our (though low) salaries? Is preservation of the past a value by itself, that does not demand any further justification? That this is not the case is shown by the fact that I, for one, do not edit and translate a text whatsoever, but only texts I deem as valuable. But in which sense are they valuable? My personal answer, for the time being, would be that they enhance critical thinking by means of proposing unusual themes and questions, thus representing a promising stimulus for human beings' perennial quest for understanding. But again, is this a value in itself? Better: can we justify its value even without any over-worldly perspective? It seems to me that critical thinking enhances our being part of a human community, in so far as it makes us more conscious of our prejudices and, hence, more able to detect them.