TOC of my forthcoming volume on reuse of texts in Indian Philosophy: UPDATE

This is the provisional Table of Content of the forthcoming volume on the analysis of the reuse in Indian philosophical texts.


Preface, by Raffaele Torella

The re-use of texts in Indian Philosophy, by Elisa Freschi (Vienna, ÖAW)

1. REUSE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS

Quotations, References, and the Re-Use of texts in the Early Nyāya Tradition, by Payal Doctor (CUNY-LaGuardia Community College)

Types of quotations as connected to the types of siddhānta in the Nyāyamañjarī 6, by Alessandro Graheli (Vienna)

Quotations of the Kāśikāvṛtti in Grammatical texts and the manuscript transmission of the Kāśikāvṛtti, by Malhar Kulkarni (IIT Mumbai)

Āgamārthānusāribhiḥ. Helārāja’s use of quotations and other referential devices in his commentary on the Vākyapadīya, by Vincenzo Vergiani (Cambridge)

Quotations, References, etc. A glance on a late Mīmāṃsaka's writing habits, by Elisa Freschi (Vienna, ÖAW)

Quotations and (lost) commentaries in Advaita Vedānta: Some philological notes on the 'Fragments' of Bhartr̥prapañca, by Ivan Andrijanić (Zagreb)

“Old is Gold!” Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s way of referring to earlier textual tradition, by Gianni Pellegrini (Turin)


1.1 SUBFOCUS ON THE BUDDHIST MILIEU: IS THERE ANYTHING SPECIFIC?
The Case of the Sārasaṅgaha. Reflections on the Reuse of Texts In Medieval Singalese Pāli Literature, by Chiara Neri (Rome "Sapienza")

The creative erudition of Chapaṭa Saddhammajotipāla, a 15th-century grammarian and philosopher from Burma, by Aleix Ruiz-Falqués (Cambridge)

The introduction of canonical and non canonical quotations in Pāli commentarial literature, by Petra Kieffer-Pülz (Mainz, AWL)

Dharmottara’s Re-Use of Arguments from the Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi in the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, by Masamichi Sakai (Cambridge, Massachusetts / Tokyo)

Commenting by quoting. The case of Manorathanandin's Pramāṇavārttikavr̥tti, by Cristina Pecchia (Vienna)

Text re-use in early Tibetan epistemological treatises, by Pascale Hugon (Vienna, ÖAW)

A discussion of some problems related to the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa with particular attention to the quotation from Saraha’s Dohākośagīti, by Krishna Del Toso (Trieste)

"As it is said in a Sūtra": Liberty and Variation in Tibetan quotations from the Buddhist scriptures, by Ulrike Rösler (Oxford)

2. WIDENING THE PICTURE: RE-USE IN NON-PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS

Quotations in Vedic Literature: is the changing of a mantra a stylistic device or
the degeneration of a “beautiful mind?, by Elena Mucciarelli (Tübingen)

To borrow or not to borrow? The case of "vaibhavīyanarasiṃhakalpa" within the scope of Pāñcarātra literature, by Ewa Debicka-Borek (Krakow)

Observations on the Use of Quotations in Sanskrit Dharmanibandhas, by Florinda De Simini (Naples/Turin)

Re-use in artistic field: the iconography of Yakṣī, by Cristina Bignami (Cagliari)

Any suggestion concerning the sections' titles, their sequence, their internal organization, etc.?

Plants in Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian Philosophy

Plants are explicitly described as non-sentient by most philosophers. Some of them are even quite crude in denying any sentience to trees. Why? Probably because they had to contrast popular "superstitions" according too much importance to plants, especially to trees.

In many of the early Buddhist legends, drawn from such sources as the Jātakas, the Dhammapadatthakathā, the Mahāvastu, the Dīpavaṃsa, the Divyāvadāna, the Aśokāvadāna, and so forth, an important dialectic is set up between the morally and spiritually perfected Buddha and various nonhuman deities such as yakṣas (Pāli, yakkhas) and the serpent deities, the nāgas. On the one hand, the Buddha incorporates and presides over a pre-existing mythology of nature. In so doing, the new religion of Buddhism is able more readily to meet the needs of an unlettered laity (Sutherland, Yakṣa in Hinduism and Buddhism p. 26).

(I would say that the same process applies to many "Hindu" religions. For instance, Arjuna marries, among other women, a nāga-princess, and his brother a Rākṣasī.) Then, philosophers had to sort out a consistent theology out of these inclusive processes and, thus, tended to deny the sentience of plants. Buddhist may have been even more harsh in this process (see Schmithausen's illuminating essays on this topic) due to the typically "Buddhist dialectic between nature and ascetism" (Sutherland, p. 28).

Universal salvation in Appayya Dīkṣita

Some Vedāntins (beginning perhaps with Vācaspati) have conceived the possibility of universal salvation (sarvamukti), i.e. the condition in which all living beings are liberated. The most compelling depiction of it I know of is found in Appayya Dīkṣita's works (especially in his Śivādvaitanirṇaya and Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha).

Appayya seems to come to the idea of sarvamukti in a purely logical way: liberation is possible for every living being. More than that, liberation is necessary for all of them, since the very bond is actually only illusory (given that nothing but brahman ultimately exists). Thus, given that time is endless, sooner or later  every living being will be liberated from nescience (ajñāna) and recognise his/her/its original identity with the brahman.
Until that moment, however, nescience is not completely destroyed and, thus, the brahman keeps on being reflected in the multiple mirrors of the single souls, which are no more than mirrors reflecting the only brahman but believing to be different from it. This means that the brahman is itself not completely free and that no soul, however advanced in the path, can be completely released.

Thus, the liberation of all other living beings is, so to say, in our own interest ("so to say" is needed, since ultimately speaking there are no multiple living beings), since until every one is released, no one can attain oneness with the absolute brahman.

Does this sound convincing? Do you see possible parallels/influences from the Buddhist concept of Bodhisattva and/or with the communio of human beings (NB: only human ones) in Christianity?

On endless time, have a look at this post.

Buddhist Manuscript Culture: Textuality and Materiality

 The team of the AHRC-funded "Sanskrit Manuscripts Project, Cambridge" (i.e., Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani, Dr. Daniele Cuneo and Dr. Camillo Formigatti) has informed me about their first project workshop, which bears the following title:

Buddhist Manuscript Culture: Textuality and Materiality

The workshop will be held at the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Cambridge, on 12th-13th April 2013. All are welcome.

Further details and a provisional programme can be found at: http://sanskrit.lib.cam.ac.uk/buddhist-manuscript-culture-textuality-and-materiality

The workshop has extremely interesting speakers, focusing on different points of view on manuscriptology, e.g., looking at manuscripts as material objects (Hildegard Diemberger and Michela Clemente, Camillo Formigatti, Imre Galambos…) or as vehicles of a text (Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, Harunaga Isaacson, Francesco Sferra, Péter-Dániel Szántó, Vincent Tournier, Gergely Hidas, Michael Hahn, Martin Straube, Margaret Cone, Lata Deokar…).
What interests you more? And why?

12th April

9.30–10.15

Keynote speech: Cristina Scherrer-Schaub The poetic of the page to beat time on the template. Inquiry into a form adopted in Indian/Indic manuscripts outside India

Codicology and History of the Book

10.15–11.00	Martin Delhey (University of Hamburg) Once again on the problem of provenance of North-East Indian and Nepalese Buddhist manuscripts: with special reference to 12th century manuscripts from the Indian monastery Vikramaśīla
11.00–11.15	Coffee Break
11.15–12.00	Harunaga Isaacson (University of Hamburg) Scattered leaves: on some Buddhist Tantric prakīrṇapattrāṇi in Cambridge University Library [provisional title]
12.–12.45	Hildegard Diemberger and Michela Clemente (University of Cambridge) Tibetan book printing: tradition and technology
12.45–13.30	Imre Galambos (University of Cambridge) From paper to palm leaves: Medieval Chinese manuscripts in the pothī format
13.30–15.00	Lunch Break
15.00–15.45	Camillo Formigatti (University of Cambridge) Buddhist Nepalese manuscripts in the Cambridge University Library collections: towards a typological classification [provisional title]
15.45–16.30	Francesco Sferra (University of Naples “L’Orientale”) Apropos of Some Buddhist Tantric Manuscripts: Add. 1108, Add. 1708.1, Or. 158
16.30–16.45	Tea Break
16.45–17.30	Vincent Tournier Protective verses for travellers: notes on a leather fragment of the *Diśāsauvastika-gāthā*s recovered from the Bāmiyān region
17.30–18.15	Arlo Griffith (EFEO Jakarta) The transmission of Buddhist scriptures to ancient Indonesia as witnessed by manuscripts preserved on Bali and inscriptions discovered throughout the archipelago

13th April

Philology and Textual Transmission

10.00–10.45

Martin Straube (University of Halle-Wittenberg) The textual transmission of Kṣemendra’s Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā

10.45–11.30

Margaret Cone (University of Cambridge) [title tba]

11.30–11.45

Coffee Break

11.45–12.15

Michael Hahn (University of Marburg) Editorial problems of Śivasvāmin’s Kapphiṇābhyudaya

12.15–13.00

Lata Deokar Subhūticandra’s Amarakośaṭīkā [provisional title]

13.00–15.00

Lunch Break

15.00–15.45

Peter Szanto (University of Oxford) Revisiting lists of Tantric Buddhist trespasses

15.45–16.30

Gergely Hidas A new look at the Mahāśītavatī

17.00–17.45

Tea Break

17.45–18.30

Round table

Sentience of plants in Indian philosophy

Are plants sentient beings or are they just living beings? In Classical India there seem to be two possible alternatives, i.e., a popular approach which regards plants as sentient and a scientific one which regards them as non-sentient.
The first one is was probably the most widespread one, since it is the target of the criticism of the upholders of the scientific view. One finds it represented also in Dharmaśāstra texts, in Purāṇas, Āgamas and in Dramas. Lambert Schmithausen has detected traces of it also in the Buddhist Canon, whenever monks refer to what (illiterate) lay people might be thinking. It is also the standard view of Jainism.
The latter view, by contrast, is the one adopted by possibly all philosophical texts I am aware of whenever they directly deal with the issue.
However, I started wondering what would Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins say about this topic (which is, I have to admit, not the most debated one in Indian philosophy), given that plants are regarded to be sentient by several Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas. While looking for an answer, I found this passage by (Śrī) Rāmānuja, in his Śrī Bhāṣya ad Brahmasūtra 1.1.4:

deva-asura-gandharva-siddha-vidyādhara-kinnara-kimpuruṣa-yakṣa-rākṣasa-piśāca-manuja-paśu-śakuni-sarīsṛpa-vṛkṣa-gulma-latā-dūrvādīnāṃ strīpunnapuṃsakabhedabhinnānāṃ kṣetrajñānāṃ vyavasthitadhārakapoṣakabhogyaviśeṣāṇāṃ muktānāṃ svasya cāviśeṣeṇānubhavasambhave svarūpaguṇavibhavaceṣṭitair anavadhikātiśayānandajananaṃ paraṃ bhrarhmāsti.

"Since it is possible that liberated beings, distinguished according to the respective specifications of supporter (as a tree), nourishment (as several plants) and object of experience (as herbs which cannot be eaten but can be seen, touched, etc.) have experience of themselves without specifications, the arousal of the super abundant bliss without limitations (avadhi) for the selves distinguished in feminine, neuter and masculine —gods, asuras, gandharvas, siddhas, vidyādharas, kinnaras, kimpuruṣas, yakṣas, demons (rākṣasa), ogres (piśāca), human beings, cattle, birds, snakes, trees, bushes, creepers, herbs and so on— through what is set into motion (ceṣṭita) by the transformations in the qualities of the own nature [of the brahman], is the supreme brahman".

Here there is a lot I do not understand (any help is welcome!), but any translation seems enough to highlight the fact that there in an unbroken succession from gods to bent herbs, which are all said to be selves (kṣetrajña, literally 'knower of the field') and that all of them can have experience (anubhavasambhava). Note that, as usual in India, the sentient beings are ordered in a rigorous succession from the highest to the lowest and that trees are on the upper level among plants. This is explained in Purāṇas and in the first kind of literature described above insofar as trees offer nourishment and protection to other living beings and are, in this sense, selfless and generous.

Can we trust our Sanskrit authors when they criticise someone else?

Can we trust the representation of a Sāṅkhya idea found in a Buddhist text? Or of a Cārvāka point of view in a Vedānta one (and so on)?
In favour of the reliability of such representations runs the following argument by Ernst Steinkellner (in his paper of the forthcoming Proceedings volume of the Fragments conference, 2012):

For the simple reason that citing an opponent's words or meaning incorrectly would be contrary to the very purpose of quoting in the first place. If the educated people were to recognize an error, a distortion, or even an ill intention in a citation or reference, a subsequent refutation would be considered thrashing empty straw and futile.

This appears like a sound and cogent argument, however:

1. 1) it only works in case of current debates. I would not trust in a similar way Buddhist objections embedded in a late Mīmāṃsā text at a time when Buddhism had already vanished from India. In such cases, stock objections are repeated and might even be simplified.
2. 2) it only works in case of up to date authors. Some authors might have been living at the periphery of the philosophical debate and have missed some of its nuances. This might be the case of Śabara when he addresses the sphoṭa theory if it is true that he lived after Bhartṛhari had developed a more complex version of it.
3. 3) it only works where we can presuppose an up to date audience. If an author is addressing an objection only in order to, e.g., keep his fellow believers content with their faith, he might just attack a simpler version of the objection. I have encountered this sort of cases in contemporary Indian philosophy and have no ground for thinking that it has never been the case in Classical philosophy.
4. 4) it only works in case of intelligent and honest authors, who have understood the objection in the first place and are not trying an easy way out of a difficult objection. I am not an expert on apoha, but during the apoha workshop in Vienna, Spring 2012, a learned participant was quite convincing in claiming that Jayanta had misrepresented (either on purpose or because he did not understand it) Dharmottara's theory of apoha.

This does not mean that Steinkellner's argument does not hold. It probably holds within the context of Steinkellner's article, i.e., within the Pramāṇavāda school and especially as regards Jinendrabuddhi's quotations of Sāṅkhya. But it might need some additions if applied to the whole of Indian Philosophy.

What do you think? Do you have further elements in favour or against it? Instances in favour of its application?

On quotations see, among many others, this post.

Kiyokazu Okita, Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism and textual reuse by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa

 In a recent volume of Religions of South Asia (6.2. 2011, appeared in December 2012), K. Okita focuses on a Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava author, Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (c. 1700-1793), who —first in his school— wrote a commentary on the Brahmasūtras. Since the Gauḍīya school was the last one to write a commentary thereon, Baladeva had before him some major predecessors. Okita takes into account the commentaries by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva.
As could be expected, Baladeva often re-uses Madhva's commentary. This is logical, because the Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavism developed out of a branch of Madhva's school and because Baladeva himself used to be a Madhvaite.
Nonetheless, Okita shows how Baladeva also re-uses Rāmānuja's commentary, due to the fact that their schools tend often to converge, notwithstanding their distinct origin.
Furthermore, elements of Śaṅkara's commentary are also reused by Baladeva, especially as prima facie views.
This leads Okita to the development of a threefold scheme for Baladeva's "quotations" (I would prefer "textual reuse"), including:

1. 1. "when he cites from the śrutis and smṛtis,
2. 2. when he quotes a previous Vedāntin in a way which is different from the original author's application;
3. 3. when he copies a previous Vedāntin following the original author's use" (p. 209).

One notices that this scheme embeds two points of view:

1. A. the type of source (śruti-smṛti vs. a follow Vedāntin) 
2. B. the kind of reuse (as an objection or in the same spirit as in the original text)

What do you think of this scheme? Could it help highlighting aspects you did not think of before?

On a different taxonomy of quotations, see this post. On the topic of textual reuse, see this post (among many others). On another article in the same issue of Religions of South Asia, see this post.